The following day being the 1st
of August the 3rd Army was activated under Lieutenant General George
S Patton and the American forces swept into Brittany while Patton’s forces
turned east to clear the Cotentin Peninsular, the First Army turned west to
link up with the advancing elements of the British 21st battle group
with a view to trapping the German 7th and 5th armies in
a huge pincer movement around the town of Falaise and destroy the German armies
in the field.
The Third Army subsequently advanced westward to capture Man, the erstwhile
headquarters of the German Seventh Army and also cut off the retreat of the
German forces trapped in the Cotentin Peninsular. German Dictator Adolf Hitler,
in a foolhardy move ordered Field Marshal Von Kluge to launch a counter
offensive against the advancing Allied Armies with a view to splitting the
British and American armies between Mortain and Avranches and throw them back
into the sea if possible.
Against his own better judgment
Von Kluge committed the remainder of his seven armored divisions in a counter
attack codenamed operation Luttich. Von Kluge’s intentions were intercepted by
the Ultra intelligence operation and the Allied commanders duly informed,
waited for him.
On August 7th the
attack was launched by the panzer divisions that could muster only 75 Panzer IV
and 70 Panther tanks and 32 self propelled guns. Hopelessly outnumbered, the
offensive was over in 24 hours with the German forces completely routed and
desperately seeking to avoid the encirclement that was closing in on them
around Falaise.
The depleted German armored divisions were almost completely annihilated
by the combined power of four Allied armies that had them completely surrounded
and pulverized with air and artillery strikes, which completely decimated them,
and left the dazed survivors fleeing on foot in the direction of the Seine
River in the bid to escape the noose of the Allied encirclement. Two complete
German armies the 7TH and the 5th were caught in the jaws
of the Allied pincers.
A failure of proper co-ordination between the 90TH division of
the First army and the inexperienced Polish 1st armored division of
the Canadian 4TH Army, particularly in the sector closed by the
Polish Corp left a fifteen mile gap through which many German soldiers managed
to escape on foot out of the pocket, leaving behind 50,000 prisoners and most
of their vehicles and equipments.
Some historians blame General
Bradley who had now been lifted to the command of the two American armies the
12th army group for stopping Patton’s forces just short of the point
of sealing the pocket for fear of the advancing British and American units
converging on the pocket clashing accidentally.
Altogether over 150,000 Germans
managed to escape from the pocket, crossed the Seine River and regrouped on the
other side. Over 100,000 German soldiers were killed or wounded in the
operation. This defeat gave the Allied armies the opportunity to advance
towards the Seine over undefended territory as all the Allied armies advanced
in pursuit of the fleeing enemy.
The fleeing Germans crossed the Seine River and hastily built a new
defensive line on the left side of the River. With the collapse of the German
positions in Normandy, the advancing British and American armies began a race
for the French capital to forestall a regrouping of the German forces.
As they approached Paris the
Allies decided to bypass the city and instead pursue the fleeing Germans to
give them no respite. General Courtney Hicks Hodges had assumed the command of
the First Army upon the elevation of Lieutenant General Omar N Bradley to the
command of the newly formed 12th Army group consisting of the US
First Army and General George S Patton’s Third Army.
Lieutenant General Hodges now
ordered his Army to cross the Seine River across bridge heads established
between Mantes – Grassi courts and Mellon to the east, beginning an equally
spectacular advance with three Corps towards Namur, Liege and the German frontier.
Moving on the right flank, VII Corps crossed the Aisne River on August 29,
while Soissons was overrun by elements of the 3rd armored division
which also seized Laon the next day after overcoming heavy enemy resistance. The
advance of the 3rd armored division proceeded swiftly and on the 1st
of September 1944 advanced to a point 30 miles north east of Laon
The next two days saw the columns advancing over 40 miles, crossing the
Belgian border in the Hirson area and reaching Charleroi and Mons. Moving on
the left flank a rapidly advancing column of XIX Corps moving from the Mantes
bridge head led by the 2nd armored division advanced over 13miles on
30th August and another 20 miles of break taking advance brought it
close to Montdidier in Belgium.
By September 2, XIX Corps had reached the Belgian border south of Tournai,
an incredible advance of 60 miles in 2 days. The consequence of this swift
advance was that the armored division completely outflanked and by passed large
pockets of German soldiers as they outpaced and outran the retreating German
army. The Germans trapped in the pocket extending from Mons area to Compiegne –
St Quentin reaching a line east of Cambrai eventually capitulated and over
25,000 of them were taken prisoner over a period of three days.
On the 4th of September, the First army turned at a right
angle to the east, with the V Corps moving on the right flank crossing the
Meuse River north of Sedan on the 5th- 6th September
1944. Sedan eventually fell to the 5th armored division on the 6th
of September opening up a front that led to a rapid advance across Belgium and
Luxembourg on a 65 mile front.
The 5th armored division eventually liberated the city of
Luxembourg on the 10th of September, and by the 11th, V Corps
had reached the German frontier, confronting the Siegfried line and its
defenses. Up north, units of the VII Corps captured the Belgian town of Namur
and the River Meuse crossings near Dinant and continued to advance down along
both banks of the River towards Liege’.
German resistance was heavy but by September 8th, the
Americans broke through and Liege fell, but the relentless advance of VII Corps
brought its leading elements into Luxembourg which was located 13 miles
southwest of Aachen. The First Army was now deep within the defensive depth of
the West wall also known as the Siegfried line.
The German crisscross of defenses, mine fields, road blocks, artillery
emplacements and pill boxes slowed down but did not completely stop the First
Army which pressed on with determination to breach the defenses of the
Siegfried line and gain a foothold on German soil.
That notwithstanding the American advance still made some territorial
gains on the 10th of September 1944 that brought the big guns of VII
Corps into range of German territory for the first time. Further north in
Belgium, VII Corps had pushed its way forward alongside XIX Corps and had
captured both Eupen and Malmedy while XIX Corps was at the outskirts of
Maastricht and further south had crossed the Meuse River.
In a spectacular advance, the First Army had swept down from the Seine
River across France, Belgium and Luxembourg and was now at the front door of
Germany in the autumn of 1944. First Army was now poised to take the first
major German city seized by the Allies in World War 2, that is Aachen and there
after invest the German positions across the Roer River in a bid to breach the
Siegfried line and make a dash for the Rhine, the last natural barrier
preventing the Allies from striking at the heart of Germany and the Ruhr
industrial region.
At this point German resistance stiffened considerably as the war entered
into Germany proper. The autumn rains, mud and onset of winter along with
swollen Rivers combined to place natural obstacles on the path of the advance of
First Army as they prepared to breach the extensive defenses of the Siegfried
line.
The expectation that the war would
be over by Christmas was to prove to be a hoax and a futile dream to the
average American as the network of pill boxes, Dragon’s teeth, forts and
concrete tunnels extending hundreds of miles across the frontlines made them
realize that defeating Germany was not going to be a walk over as they had been
led to believe.
The First Army thus had the tough privilege of taking the first major German
city in battle. The initial plan had centered on by passing the city and
allowing it to fall on its own terms but as the Allies advanced, it became
increasingly clear that the Germans were preparing an all out defense, and that
it would be dangerous to leave such a well fortified position in the rear of
the Allied lines. General Courtney Hodges therefore ordered the units of the
VII Corps to invest the city beginning in the first week of September.
Because Aachen sat right in the middle of the Siegfried line it was
completely fortified with an extensive network of tunnels, pill boxes, barbed
wire entanglements and concrete obstacles known as Dragon’s teeth. Because of
its historical importance and strategic location it had become imperative to
seize it in the drive to Germany proper.
Even though the German garrison
commander General Gerhard Von Schwerin commanding the 116th Panzer
division had intended to surrender the city to the Allies in order to spare the
civilian population the ravages of war and also save the old imperial city from
destruction, Adolf Hitler’s directive for him to launch an attack on the Allied
lines frustrated his plans, which in any case was soon divulged to Hitler when
his surrender letter was intercepted and delivered to Hitler.
He was promptly arrested and replaced by General Gerhard Wilck, who set about
defending the city with the corresponding heavy loss of lives and destruction of
property. By the 16 TH of September, Aachen had been surrounded on
three sides by the First Army’s 1st infantry division but the dearth
of supplies and the diversion of logistics support to assist Field Marshall
Montgomery’s Operation Market Garden in the Netherlands prevented the First
Army from immediately taking the city.
The fighting eventually carried on through late October and involved
bitter battles on the part of the 30th and 1st infantry
divisions which bore the brunt of the fighting and the casualties. Aachen being
on the hinge of the Siegfried line saw the beginning of a stiffening of German
defenses and a willingness to fight on the part of the Germans that had not
been obvious in France particularly after the battles of the hedgerows and the
break out from Brittany.
In Aachen, which represented the first calculated effort by the Allies to
denigrate and ultimately breach the Siegfried line, the American fighting
spirit in the face of a tenacious all- out defense began to emerge. For once
both parties shared parity in terms of determination to hold pre-determined
objectives, which for the Americans rested on a determination to destroy the
German army once and for all, regardless of the cost.
Aachen and ultimately the battle
of the Hurtgen forest showed the beginning of a willingness by the American
military authorities to pay the price for victory in blood and material losses
in a way that stunned the German High Command and began to shape their beliefs
in the fact that unless the Americans in particular could be stopped, the war
was lost as far as the western front was concerned. A lot of steely resolve was
demonstrated by both parties as the hard slog unfolded.
In Aachen the First Army fought a sustained battle of attrition for over
six weeks from the first week of September to the third week of October. In the
words of General Eisenhower it was the beginning of the hard slog campaign against
the German enemy in the face of the clear defeat the Allies faced in Operation
Market Garden which was thought up by Field Marshal Montgomery as a plan to
force a way into Germany through the northern route and thereby outflank the
Siegfried line.
It had become pretty clear after the failed operation that there was just
no way to outflank the Siegfried line and the dreary prospect of the positional
and entrenched warfare of 1914-1918 loomed as an unavoidable prospect for the
Allies as the First Army bore down on Aachen.
Sited in a defensive belt that
stretched more than10 miles deep with concrete fortifications , pillboxes, mine
fields and dragon’s teeth that hindered the deployment of Armor , Aachen and
ultimately the Siegfried line would have to be taken and breached the old
fashioned way.
Not even the overwhelming Allied air superiority could grant the Allies
an easy cake walk in the ensuing battle cum struggle. The battle would have to
involve infantry assaults supported with Armor and artillery where feasible.
For the battle the First Army threw in the 1st infantry division of
General Joseph Collin’s VII Corps and the 30TH infantry division of General
Charles H Corllet’s XIX Corps, supported by the 2nd armored division,
which was to exploit the anticipated breakthrough by broadening the scope of
penetration of the advance while the 29th infantry was meant to
protect the flanks.
The Germans on their part committed the 116TH Panzer division
initially to garrison the town. They eventually added General Friedlich
Kochlling’s LXXXI’s Corps which included the 183rd and the 246th
Volksgrenadier divisions to strengthen the defense of the city. In addition
they also included the 12th and 49th infantry division,
which came to about 20,000 men and 11 tanks including the attached 506th
tank battalion and the 108th tank brigade.
As the war progressed and
casualties mounted, the average numerical strength of a German division had
dropped from 15-17,000 men at the start of the war to 12,500 men. By November 1944, the numerical strength of a
Heer Division had dropped to 8,761 men.
The 2nd battle of Aachen raged from the 2nd of
October to the 21st of October when central Aachen fell to the men
of the 26th infantry regiment reinforced with elements of the 110th
infantry regiment and the Aachen garrison commanders surrendered in the hotel
Quellenhorf, that same day. American casualties numbered over 5,000 killed and
wounded with German casualties of about 5,000 but with an additional 5,600
taken prisoner. The 30th infantry division alone suffered about
3,000 men killed and wounded while the 1st infantry division
suffered about 1,350 casualties with 150 killed and 1,200 wounded.
First Army was now directed to capture a number of dams on the Roer River
behind the Hurtgen forest from where the Germans could flood the whole plains
and hinder the drive to the Cologne plains and the Ruhr industrial region. This
was followed by a period of rest and refitting. After this, plans were drawn up
to clear the Roer river bank with a view to breaking into the Cologne plains
where the dams were situated on the periphery of the Ruhr industrial region.
The First Army thus prepared for the difficult task of breaching the
Siegfried line and advancing across the Roer River basin. The plan was to break
out of the Hurtgen forest towards the Roer River and finally on to the Cologne
plains. To achieve this, the town of Schmidt had to be taken. The 28th
armored division led the drive to Schmidt through the difficult wooded country
on the 2nd November, 1944.
On the same day another regiment resumed its own offensive towards
Vossenack, while the 2nd armored division headed for Schmidt on a
three pronged attack through the heavily forested, mined and defended Hurtgen
forest. The ensuing battle was to become a nightmare for the units of the First
army that were to fight through the woods, rain, cold, mud and snow. Casualties
were heavy and German resistance was stiff.
Advances were measured in hundreds of meters and yards or a few
kilometers. The men were dispirited, but fought on. Getting out of the Hurtgen
forest was the major challenge. Not since the dense hedgerows of France had the
First Army confronted such difficult fighting conditions against a desperate
enemy who knew the terrain and exerted a heavy toll for every footage gained.
In the course of the attack, miles of roads had to be built through the heavily
wooded area as few paved roads existed in the dense forest.
The third spear head also moved on the same day towards Hurtgen village
and the men continued to advance for the next two days in the face of mounting
counter attacks. Units of the 28TH Infantry division continued to
advance through the Hurtgen forest against opposition that was so stiff that
advance actually came to a halt.
Self propelled artillery and anti
tank guns were used to repel enemy counter attacks in the desperate fighting
that ensued. The German defense plan was hinged on containing the Allied direct
thrust on the Roer River by holding off the advance in the Hurtgen forest as it
was naturally suited for defensive warfare.
The coming of winter and snowfalls, a week after the advance began,
helped to complicate matters for the Americans as vehicular and tank movements
were impeded by the cold and men had to dig to find protection from the hostile
elements so as not to lose their hard won territorial gains. The advance
practically bogged down in the midst of the harsh winter. In view of this,
Major General Gerow, commander of the 5th Corps had to halt further advances
and ordered that guns be cleaned and packaged up in camouflage nets to secure
their protection against the hostile elements.
The First Army used the opportunity provided by the pause in offensive
operations to build up a major supply depot in Liege to strengthen the supply
and logistics support of the advancing units. The supply lines had been
stretched thin due to the rapid pace of advance and the great distance covered
between Normandy and the Seine River and from there to the German border.
Supplies barely kept pace with the advancing troops and this many times led the
frontline troops to face critical shortage of clothing and winter gear in the
face of the increasingly harsh and hostile weather and the stiffening German
resistance.
The supply depot was meant to build up supplies against the upcoming
drive to the Rhine River after the crossing of the Roer and these meant that signals
and communication facilities had to be built up. New transmission equipments of
various kinds were received, installed and put in place.
The First Army also had to find
ways to bypass the fixed obstacles and fortifications along the Siegfried line.
One solution devised involved heaping huge piles of laterite upon the dragon’s
teeth with a view to burying the dragons’ teeth beneath the laterite and create
a path way for vehicular traffic and movement of tanks and support vehicles
through the obstacles.
Fresh roads had to be laid in the
thick forest amid the mud and the squall to enable supply trucks keep up pace
with the combat troops in what was then known as the Red Ball express as the
hour of attack drew near. On the 16th of November, the attack was
resumed in the Hurtgen forest in the direction of the Cologne plain and the
first objective was the clearing of the Roer River area.
The thrust of the First Army
advance was led by the three divisions of the VII Corps and they were to move
north from the forest along the super highway that led to Duren. The operation
was to be carried out in two concerted drives. The First infantry and third
armored division were to advance eastward to Mausbach while the 104th
division was to push north after clearing Stolberg.
East of Aachen, barrage balloons were put in place to identify enemy
positions that were to be bombed, making them the first use of barrage balloons
for this particular purpose. British and American aircraft in waves bombed and
softened up the German positions with a view to opening up a way for the
American advance.
Bombers from the strategic bomber
command struck the strong point of Duren which the German command had fortified
and which stood in the way of the advance of the First army. No advance to the
Roer was possible without the neutralization of Duren which had become a strong
point that stood right in the path of the advance. Fragmentation bombs and
incendiaries were used on the attack in Duren setting off huge fires and the
resulting smoke was visible for miles around.
A reconnaissance group was scheduled to lead the 104th’s drive
to Stolberg. Following the briefing on the afternoon of the 16th of
November, the first section set off to deploy along the road for
reconnaissance. The following day ground troops of the division stood by to
begin the assault on Stolberg. They had to use forest trails to outflank German
defenses that had pinned down two battalions in the forest.
The third armored division’s assault guns covered their line of movement
from positions bordering the line of attack. On 19th November the
ninth air force flew in support of the attack despite heavy enemy anti aircraft
fire, to strengthen the First and Ninth Army attacks. Over 1,600 aircraft were
involved in the attacks.
They strafed the Germans dug in at Stolberg who were holding up the
advance. Stolberg was finally taken on the 25th of November by the
104th division. Demolition charges meant for removing booby traps
and explosives were used in some of the houses to clear way for the troops to
advance.
It took another two weeks before
the American flag could fly over the city. Meanwhile other units advanced to
Ershwhiler on November 20 which was the largest German city between Aachen and
Duren. By the end of the second day, the city had been cleared of snipers and a
military government was installed.
From Ershwhiler, the attack moved to Vicewiler which fell two days later.
From there the army moved to the town of Franz which lay on the Indie River. With
all the roads leading to the town under German fire and with all bridges blown,
the engineers had to bridge the Indie River to enable the division to advance.
The 28th of November saw the fall of the town after a heavy
artillery barrage and the division advanced across the Indie River to take two
more towns, thus carving up four-fifths of the way to the Roer River.
Meanwhile the 3rd armored division employed rocket launchers
in the Mausbach area as they approached the Roer River. This was the first use
of Rocket launchers by the First Army. 75 launchers loosened 600 projectiles in
a single volley firing over 1,800 rockets. From Mausbach the tanks moved on to Groznyy
where the Germans knocked out some tanks as the column advanced with
determination with tanks and supporting
artillery fire and after two days of fighting took Groznyy.
The attack of the First army led by the VII Corps concentrated on three
fronts, one towards Eschweiler , the other towards Stolberg and another towards
the Hurtgen forest all meanwhile heading
to the Roer River. Food and ammunition, basic essentials for the advance were
being delivered in spite of the inclement weather. In the Hurtgen forest, the 4th
and 8th infantry divisions renewed their offensive on the 16th
of November. This time heavy field guns were brought to bear in the attempt to
clear the forest. Heavy enemy resistance in the thickly wooded forest did not
deter the men as they pressed forward doggedly.
Sometimes it took literally crawling hands and foot by the men to inch
their way through the forest. Casualties were heavy in all parts of the forest
and the fighting was heavy. The 4th division’s relentless advance
brought them to the last enemy held town of Groshouse where the last pocket of
resistance was decimated on the 28th of November 1944.
Heavy artillery support enabled the 4th division to break
through the enemy defenses in the Hurtgen forest campaign. Eight divisions of the First Army were also thrown
into the fray at the height of the Hurtgen forest campaign. Supported by one
combat command of the 5th armored division, it launched its drive on
the 22nd of November with a rocket barrage. The rockets were firing
at the enemy position at Klineham and it was estimated that one such battery equaled
the fire power of five artillery divisions.
More than a thousand sorties were flown by the fighter bombers of the US
Eight Air force. After this the field
guns took over pulverizing the German positions and two days later Klineham was
captured. The Hurtgen village was later cleared and secured late in November.
Turning south, the division moved forward to take two more towns, Brandenburg
and Bierch town. Thereafter they proceeded to mop up the remaining German
positions between them and the Roer River. At last the troops could relax as
they had finally succeeded in clearing the Hurtgen forest by the end of the
first week of December even though the campaign had cost the first army about
34,000 casualties and there has been debate till this day as to whether the
Hurtgen forest campaign was even necessary at all in the light of the later
German offensive in the battle of the Bulge.
By December 8, the troops had established one sector of the First Army
positions along the banks of the Ruhr River preparatory to crossing it. Troop
replacements were effected in the first week of December when the First Army
paused before completing the drive. The 9th infantry division fresh
from a rest center in Belgium moved up. It was on its way to relieve the battle
weary 1st infantry division which had seen continuous action since
the drive began.
As the convoys passed each other, the 9th moved forward to
take up positions at the front. Relief and relocations also took place in other
areas during this brief lull in the fighting as the first Army gathered its
strength for the final leap to the Ruhr River.
A fresh thrust on the 10th of December from the town of
Luckkaburg was fiercely contested as German resistance grew stiffer partly
because of a shortened line of supply and particularly because the German
troops were now defending their homeland. The Allied advance in October,
November and early December before the battle of the Bulge that started on the
16th of December was truly a painful slog for the armies and
particularly for the First army which lay in the central line of advance to the
heart of the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland.
From Luckkaburg, the First army on the 10th of December began
to advance on Pier and by the 12th of December, had the city
surrounded and after two days of desperate fighting Pier fell and the 104th
division moved on to wipe out the last trace of German resistance along the
banks of the Roer River.
The third armored division began to shell shlik on the 10th of
December which was one of the strong points remaining west of Duren. Men of the
newly arrived 9th infantry division went into action in close
co-ordination with the third armored division which launched a new piece of
equipment, a rotary mine exploder. German prisoners and strugglers meanwhile
were picked up from their hideouts along the path of advance.
On the 11th of December after a heavy concentration of
artillery, machine gun and tank fire, resistance at Shlik was crushed and the
men of the 9th infantry division took prisoners, among them a group
of German women who had been collaborating with the soldiers. Thereafter, the
strongly defended town of Gaick was surrounded and completely pulverized by
American mortar and shellfire when the 3rd armored division came
down upon it.
The attack was preceded by a smoke screen as the American tanks bore down
on the town which was seized shortly afterwards. Simultaneously from the
fingers of the Hurtgen forest, the last of the three drives finally got under
way. The Americans concentrated armored power along the entire line of attack
as the motorized columns swept forward irresistibly supported by the newly
brought up units of the 83rd
division capturing the last objectives in the Roer River basin and the suburb
of Duren.
By the 13th of December, the First army was sweeping forward,
driving the enemy back along the entire length of the banks of the Roer River.
Gettsany came under attack the same day and the Germans in defeat began to
increasingly rely on snipers and isolated units to slow or try to halt the
First army drives.
Tanks and tank destroyers many times had to pulverize whole buildings in
order to knock out entrenched German defenders who put up determined resistance
along the path of advance of the First army as it cleared the west bank of the
Roer River. With the capture of Hurtgen village on the 15th of
December 1944, the focus of the Armies were forced to shift from Hurtgen forest
to the Ardennes where a new unexpected and sweeping German attack was launched
on the 16th of December 1944 in what came to be known as the
Ardennes offensive or more popularly the Battle of the Bulge.
The sweep across Western Europe by all four Allied armies that
participated in trapping and destroying the German 7th and 4th armies in the
Falaise pocket had pushed the Allied front all the way from the Seine River in
France across Belgium Luxembourg, parts of Holland into the German borders.
German resistance had begun to
stiffen until the advance along the entire length of the front had degenerated
into a hard slug as the Allies debated about the best approach to bringing
Germany to defeat in the face of mounting supply problems exacerbated by their
fast and rapid advance across France.
The Allied advance had put a great strain on the supply network as the
supply trucks struggled to keep pace with the rapidly advancing armored and infantry
columns. By early October it had become quite clear that maintaining the
momentum of the advance of the three battle groups, the British 21st
army group, and the American 12th and 6th armies
was proving to be impossible. While the Allies were debating on which route to
take into Germany, whether a narrow single thrust all the way to Berlin or a
broad front as preferred by Eisenhower the supreme commander, events in the
Ardennes took the initiative out of their hands.
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