THE US FIRST ARMY THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE CHAPTER 7

THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Just as soon as the Hurtgen forest fell to the US first army on the 15^th   of December, the following day being the 16^th of December 1944, saw the launch of Germany’s last major offensive on the Western front which came to be known as the battle of the Bulge because of the bulge created in Allied lines as shown in the battle maps on American newspapers.

That the Germans could mount such a major offensive, taking the Allies completely by surprise along 80 kilometers of the front line defended by First army units stretched between the Ardennes forests in Belgium all the way down south to Luxembourg was completely unexpected.

The German assault fell primarily on the First army which had been heavily engaged in the battle of the Hurtgen forest, and was determined to drive to the Rhine along the lines of the Roer River through the Cologne plains while capturing the Roer River dams.

While units of the First army were busy down south locked in a bitter fight with the German army in the Hurtgen area, the army had sent the experienced but tired 28^th Infantry division from the Hurtgen battle zone to the Ardennes forested area between Belgium and Luxembourg for rest and refit. It had deemed the Ardennes front a quiet area where tired divisions could be rested and green troops or newly arriving divisions could be billeted and refitted pending engagements.

 Apart from the heavily forested terrain which made the area unsuitable table for movement of mechanized forces and large scale maneuvers, the Allies knew also that the Germans were also using their front along the Ardennes as a rest and refit area. Apparently, the Allies had not drawn any conclusions from the Ardennes offensive of the German army in June 1940, when German Army Group Center’s armored drive through the Ardennes had caught the French unprepared and breached the entire French lines leading to the collapse of France in June of 1940

General Omar Bradley took the costly decision to rest the newly arrived 107^th and 109^th Infantry in the Ardennes area believing it to be a quiet sector. The combat hardened 28^th infantry division incidentally was also sent there to rest and refit. Meanwhile all major allied offensive operations had come to a halt in the middle of December as the winter deepened and Christmas approached.

The general belief was that the German army had been so thoroughly beaten that it could no longer launch any major offensive operations. The Allies reasoned that the Germans were concentrating on defensive operations as the three months earlier retreat of the Germans from the Falaise pocket had destroyed their offensive capabilities.

 Unfortunately both Generals Bradley and Courtney Hodges strongly subscribed to these views and that was why inexperienced troops were deployed to man the Allied lines stretching from the Ardennes to Luxembourg. Some intelligence reports which suggested the contrary and even insinuated that the Germans were planning a major offensive operation that winter were dismissed outright as being unfounded and impracticable.

 That the Allied High command failed to grasp the fact that the Germans were planning a major offensive, even though intelligence available was sketchy was simply the product of over confidence on the part of the Allies and an underestimation of the capability of the Germans that was borne out of the three month long pursuit of the German armies across France. The overwhelming sentiment lay with the ultimately unfounded rumor that the war will be over by Christmas. How the rumor gained currency and eventually began to inform Allied policy by December is still a subject of controversy.

The First Army was to pay dearly for this complacency on the part of the commanders that led to the placement of fresh and untried troops in the direct path of a German assault that consisted of armor, self propelled guns and mechanized infantry. Germany’s best armored units consisting of shock troops under SS General Sepp Dietrich’s sixth army was to lead the main advance right into the heart of the First Army.

 In fact German intelligence knew that the Allies were under the impression that the Germans could no longer launch any major offensive operations, particularly in the midst of the particularly harsh winter of that year. Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt the Supreme German Commander in the West and Field Marshal Walter Model Army group B commander managed to ensure that the offensive was planned in utmost secrecy taking full advantage of faulty Allied intelligence and the unwillingness of the Allied Generals to believe that the German army could mount a major offensive that winter.

The Allies chose to pause for a while before knocking down Germany’s front door. In fact the overwhelming sentiment among the American troops particularly in the Ardennes sector as mid December approached was that the war would be over by Christmas. How that story gained ground was one mystery that till date is difficult to unravel. It however was a revelation of the lax approach of the Allied commanders to the danger of a resurgent Germany in the winter of 1944.

 

The Allies completely underestimated the offensive capability of the German army. Even the highly effective Ultra Intelligence program failed to reveal the up-coming German offensive, mainly because as the Allies advanced into Germany from France, the flow of Ultra was drying up as German communications began to shift from Radio transmissions to the fixed land telephone lines that were not amenable to Ultra intercepts. Certain discerning officers in the Third army and the US First army tried to warn the Allied High Command of the imminence of a German offensive in the winter, but their warnings were completely dismissed as unrealistic and unfounded.

Meanwhile Adolf Hitler had since early November been secretly marshalling forces albeit Germany’s last reserves for a great attack on the Anglo-American armies with a view to splitting them, capturing Antwerp and forcing the trapped armies to sue for peace.

 His plan was to strike in the middle of the Allied lines in the Ardennes forest, severe it, reach the Meuse River, cross it and there after race for Antwerp. He planned to seize Antwerp and thereby cut off the 21^st British army group on the northern shoulder of the penetration from the rest of the American armies and thereby split the Allies militarily and psychologically, in which state he was sure they will be ready to sue for peace.

 On the other hand the ensuing stalemate will buy him time and hold off the Allies until his new miracle weapons were in place. For this new blitzkrieg, he relied heavily on superior armored power, particularly the new Tiger and King Tiger tanks which he knew were superior to any tanks the Allies had. Weighing over seventy tonnes they completely outclassed the fifty five ton Sherman, the Allied mainstay and had sufficient fire power to rip through the Allied lines particularly if the weather was bad enough to keep Allied planes grounded.

 For the offensive he initially planned to use 45 divisions consisting of 12 panzer and panzer grenadier divisions supported by well over 30 infantry divisions to support the armored penetration and also to protect the flanks of the attack. Altogether about three armies, Sepp Dietrich’s 6^th Panzer army was to lead the spear head in the middle striking between Bastogne and St Vith, get to the Meuse River between Liege and Namur all within the First army’s rest and refit area.

The Germans knew that the American divisions occupying this terrain were weak, inexperienced or tired; and that is where they concentrated their main thrust. German weather forecast had accurately predicted a four day complete overcast beginning 16^th December during which allied air traffic would be grounded and unable to interdict the German offensive from the air.

The German plan called for the German offensive to be across the Meuse River in four days and thereafter head west for Antwerp and finally Brussels. Hitler deemed the Americans, the weaker foe, with lesser powers of resistance to his shock tactics. But his plan to attack through the First army’s lines in the Ardennes seemed right in that weak and inexperienced divisions stood in the way except for the battle hardened 28^th infantry division and the 101^st infantry division that had arrived just three days to the beginning of the offensive.

  Three German armies all equipped with armor led the drive alongside a fourth army, the 15^th with four infantry divisions to clear the flanks. In as much as the drive was armor-led, the Germans at this point faced a critical shortage of gasoline arising from the Allied air campaign that had not only largely destroyed the Romanian oilfields, but had also completely shattered Germany’s synthetic oil production facilities. Oil production was at this time about one-fifth of the normal production level.

The German plan to a large extent depended on speed, surprise and the ability to capture the American fuel depots and dumps that lay along the way to re- supply the advancing panzer divisions. Particularly of interest was the fuel dump at Liege where over two million gallons of petrol was stored up. Leading the spearhead was the 6^th SS panzer division under SS General Sepp Dietrich with the mission of capturing Antwerp. The 5^th panzer army led by General Hasso Von Manteuffel was assigned to the middle with the objective of capturing Brussels.

The German 7^th army under General Erich Brandenberger was assigned to the southernmost front with a duty to protect the flanks of the attack. Without tanks and having only four infantry divisions it expectedly made little headway.

Also included was the German 15^th army which had just been refitted after the heavy losses incurred in France and in Operation Market Garden and was assigned the northern most end of the line in the Ardennes with the task of holding back US forces from threatening the flank of the attack.

Commanding the German armies was Field Marshal Walther Model, in charge of army group B and Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt overall commander in the West. Eventually the Germans due to critical manpower shortages could muster only 30 Infantry divisions to support the armored penetrations.

All these were unknown to the Allies who by reason of

1.     Bad weather, had their planes grounded

2.     Loss of ultra traffic because the Germans had imposed total radio silence and were rather using telephones and telegraphic massages to relay information

3.     Nonexistence of underground resistance movements in the forward areas as the battle lines had shifted away from France where the French resistance had provided invaluable information to the Allied planners.

To transport all the materials for the offensive, horse drawn carriages had to be resorted to as the critical fuel situation had adversely affected motorized transport. The offensive was consequently shifted forward to the 16^th of December to accommodate the delays in moving men and materials.

As part of the plan, the German veteran paratroop commander Otto Skorzeny who had earlier in the previous year rescued Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini from captivity, was assigned the task of leading a force of English-speaking German paratroopers dressed in American uniforms to land behind the American lines to cut telephone wires, sabotage signposts, disrupt Allied supplies and generally cause confusion among the Allied troops in an operation known as Operation Greif. They were to appear as American MPs with a view to disorganizing the Allied lines from the rear.

To facilitate his direction of the campaign, Adolf Hitler shifted his headquarters from East Prussia to Berlin and from there to the Eagle’s nest, his headquarters in Southern Germany near Cologne from where he had directed the 1940 German invasion of France. The offensive was timed to take place before the expected Soviet winter offensive which the Germans knew was in the offing any moment then.

The German assault began on December 16, 1944 at 0530 hours with a massive artillery barrage on the Allied front facing the 6^th panzer army, which turned out to be basically against the lines held by units of the US First army. In fact the resulting bulge caused by the penetration almost cut the First army in two keeping units of the army on separate ends of the bulge

The opening attacks of the German sixth Panzer army fell on the lines held by First army’s 2^nd infantry and 99^th division at the Elsenborn Ridge which put up a heavy and stubborn resistance unlike what the Germans expected, forcing the Germans to bring in the tanks to the attack earlier than planned. A heavy snow storm in the Ardennes contributed to difficulties experienced by both armies as the tanks and motorized transport struggled to advance through the snow covered roads.

The bad weather while keeping Allied air power out of operation also hampered the flow of the German advance as snow storms and blizzards made motor transport hazardous. Soon traffic jams and break down of motorized units began to ensue.

In the center in the 20 miles wide Schnee Eifel sector, the German 6^th army attacked positions held by the 106^th infantry and 28^th US division areas and scored their most spectacular success in that they completely surrounded  and forced the surrender of two regiments the (422^nd and 423rd) of the US 106^th infantry division. Over 7,000 Americans were taken prisoner in the largest surrender of American forces in the western front between the years 1944 - 1945.

Further south, Hasso Von Manteuffel’s fifth army crossed the Our River and attacked the key centers of St Vith and Bastogne. German tanks seized the surrounding villages.

German failure to quickly make a dash for undefended Bastogne as the armored columns bogged down on the narrow roads due to bad weather, traffic congestion and constant American attacks enabled the 101^st airborne to enter into Bastogne while the 82^nd airborne division rushed to St Vith at the instance of the Allied supreme commander General Eisenhower to strengthen the defenses of both key junction towns and slow the German advance on December 19^th 1944.

The heroic defense of Bastogne by the experienced paratroopers of the 101^st airborne forced the Germans to bypass the town and follow the secondary routes that the strong defense of Bastogne forced them to follow.

By the 19^th of December as the offensive gained momentum and seeing the danger the German offensive posed, General Eisenhower summoned his principal commanders to Verdun for a conference where he directed Patton’s Third army to detach six divisions from the Saar region where the Third army had just launched an offensive, and head up north to shore up the American lines held by the First army on whose sector the entire German blow fell.

In the south, the advance of the German 15^th army under General Brandenberger whose strength was four infantry divisions made an advance of just four miles before being halted by elements of the US 8^th corps that resolutely barred their way. Only the German 5^th Parachute Division was able to make an advance of over 12 miles on the inner flank in pursuit of its given assignment.

It had become obvious to General Eisenhower and the Allied leadership that the offensive was not a local offensive but a major offensive and for this reason six divisions of the Third army were sent to relieve the First army particularly in the defense and relief of the siege on Bastogne

The 101^st airborne had already occupied Bastogne while the 82^nd airborne division was committed at St Vith to hold back Sepp Dietrich’s 6^th Panzer army. Altogether over 250,000 reinforcements were sent to shore up the defenses of the US First and Ninth armies as they sought to contain the German onslaught.

Another German operation called Operation Stosser was planned for the 16^th of December but was eventually shifted to the 17^th of December because of bad weather and fuel shortages. Units of the German paratroop forces known as fallschirmjagers were to be dropped about 11 kilometers north of Malmedy to hold the Baroque Michel cross roads in advance of 12^th  SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend’s advance in order to hamper the flow of Allied reinforcements and supplies in the area.

Strong snow storms and wintry winds adversely affected the airlift with the planes missing their drop zones and having the paratroopers scattered miles beyond the intended drop zone. With only 300 men available to secure the cross roads, the German commander knew his men could not secure the objective and instead resulted to guerilla – like attack tactics to disorganize the Allies who seeing the wide dispersal of troops involved in the scattered drop imagined a force equal to a division was involved in the drop.

The Allies thus committed large numbers of soldiers to seek and destroy the paratroopers and to secure their flanks instead of heading straight on to face the German onslaught.

Operation Greif led by Otto Skorzeny also succeeded in infiltrating the Allied rear, disrupting communications, turning around road signs and generally causing confusion. Although they failed to take the bridges on the Meuse River, their presence caused apprehension and confusion out of proportion to their real number. Numerous Allied check points had to be mounted and questions were thrown at moving G.I’s who had to give correct answers before they were allowed through. To worsen matters some of the captured German MPs confessed they had on a mission to kill Eisenhower in Paris.

The resulting Allied road blocks and security checks caused great disruptions to the traffic of men and materials as everybody had to endure a check.  The tightened security invariably led to the capture of many of the infiltrators who were summarily executed for wearing  enemy uniform an offence punishable by death under the laws of war, even though Otto Skorzeny himself and a few others were able to evade capture and survive the war.