Malmedy Massacre
To the north, units of
the 6th SS Panzer Army Kampfgruppe Peiper made up of 4,800 men and
600 vehicles under the command of Waffen SS Colonel Joshen Peiper had advanced
west into Belgium and at 0700 hours in December 17 had captured a US fuel dump
at Bullingen. Further south, Hasso Von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army
crossed the Our River and attacked the key centers of St Vith and Bastogne.
German tanks seized the surrounding villages. Advancing west ward, at 1230 hours near the village
of Baugnez half way between Malmedy and Ligneuville, they encountered a unit of
the American 285th Field artillery observation battalion, who were
seized after a brief exchange of gunfire. The prisoners together with some others captured
earlier numbered about 150. Meanwhile
the advancing Panzer Grenadiers had handed over the American prisoners, who
were sent to stand in a field on a cross road to be handed over to a group of
rear guard SS detachment.
Here while standing in the field, they were
herded round and machine gunned by the SS detachment meant to oversee them in a
callous act that came to be known as the Malmedy massacre. Some of the
survivors were able to escape into the neighboring forest. In all over 84 men
were killed.
The escaping prisoners took the news to the Allied
lines where the news of the shooting spread like wildfire, caused consternation
and ultimately stiffened resistance to the advance. The news that the Germans
were not taking prisoners alive, though ultimately not true; as this incident
and one other massacre seemed to suggest, nevertheless had a dramatic effect on
the retreating and demoralized American forces. The battle as a result now took
on the ferocity of the fight to the deaths which American forces were more
familiar with in the Pacific theater.
The Americans
subsequently took revenge in shooting scores of German prisoners particularly the
SS fallschirmjagen (paratroopers). The news of the prisoners- killing
subsequently stiffened the fighting spirit of the American soldiers who now believed
that surrendering was no longer a viable option. No SS soldier was guaranteed
his safety any more in American captivity and few Americans thereafter were
willing to be taken prisoner, to the ultimate detriment of the German advance
in the Battle of the Bulge.
The subsequent advance
of the Sixth SS Panzer Army encountered much stiffer resistance as the Germans
approached positions of the US 99th Infantry Division who put up a
stiff fight in spite of the fact that the men were green. The prisoner shooting
incident stiffened the fighting spirit of the soldiers and the German advance
began to encounter stiff bottlenecks as the Americans denied them gains at
every road block, villages, hamlets, destroying bridges, fuel dumps and
anything that could aid the German advance.
When the German
advance reached Stavelot, they were far behind schedule as they took thirty six
hours to accomplish in 1944 what took them only nine hours to accomplish in the
same advance in 1940. Eleven black soldiers were also shot by the 1st
SS Division under Kampfgruppe Hungen but due to paucity of evidence, this
massacre went largely unpublicized and unavenged.
Before the battle of
the Bulge, colored soldiers in the US army were not assigned to combat duties
but served only as stevedores, truck drivers and in logistics support. The
paucity of fighting men at the height of this battle and the desperate need for
re-enforcements at the front coupled with the inability of the training schools
back in the US to meet the increasing need of trained replacements for combat
duties finally persuaded General Eisenhower to issue orders authorizing willing
colored units to participate in combat duties.
In many instances cooks, medics, drivers and
other non-combatants were drafted into the fight to stem the German advance as
the need arose particularly in the early days of the attack when the Allied
lines were dangerously stretched to a breaking point. The performance of the
colored soldiers was not perceived as any much different from that of the
regular G.I’s.
If anything they were
overly enthusiastic about the opportunity given to them to engage in regular
combat and correct the negative stereo types concerning colored troops
generally. Colored units thereafter were generally albeit grudgingly allowed to
fight in the frontlines in WW2 in the European theater of Operation even though
the units remained strictly segregated along racial lines.
However colored troops
taken as prisoners stood the greater risk of being shot by the racially
murderous SS units and it is believed that the fate that befell the eleven
black soldiers taken prisoners and shot was racially inspired.
Sixth Panzer Army’s
assault on Stavelot on December 18th encountered bitter resistance from the
American defenders who were ready to fight to the death, the Malmedy Massacre
being at the back of every soldiers involved in the battle. Peiper unable to
breach the American defenses in spite of his heavily armored columns left a
small support force at the front and detoured to the bridge at Trois – Parte,
where the retreating American Engineers had already destroyed the bridge. He
subsequently went off to the village of La Gleize and from there to Stormount
where the bridge was blown up in his face by the American defenders.
With his troops
trapped behind the American lines as the Americans recaptured Stavelot on
December 19, the Sixth Panzer Army decided to pull back to La Gleize to await a
German relief force which never materialized. With no relief force able to
penetrate the strongly held American lines, the Germans on December 23rd
were forced to escape on foot through the Allied lines back to Germany thereby
abandoning all their vehicles and heavy equipments.
In St Vith, elements
of the US First Army’s 7th Armored Division, including one regiment
of the US 106th Infantry Division as well as elements of the US 9th
Armored Division and the US 28th Infantry Division all under the
command of General Bruce C Clarke set up a road block that successfully
resisted the attacks of Manteuffel’s 5th Panzer Army and Sepp Dietrich’s
Sixth Panzer Army; thereby slowing the German advance at critical points.
Under heavy pressure,
the US forces defending St Vith were ordered to give up and withdraw to
prepared defensive positions nearby where they were entrenched in a dogged
defense. By December 23rd, with their flanks shattered by the German
armored assaults, the defenders were withdrawn to a point west of the Salk
River. Meanwhile the German attack had fallen behind schedule and was daily
losing the momentum as the American defenses stiffened.
Lt General George S Patton, meanwhile ordered to reinforce
the defenses of the First Army and relieve Bastogne by Allied Supreme Commander
General Dwight D Eisenhower had committed Three Corps of his Third Army to the
operation with the 4th Armored Division under direct orders to
relieve the 101st Airborne Division encircled in Bastogne by the
German Army.
On December 20th
General Eisenhower detached the US First and Ninth Armies from Lt General Omar
N Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group and placed them under the command of Field
Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s British 21st Army Group. It was a
decision that left Bradley bitter and resentful over the depletion of his
command even though it was obvious that he had been struggling to direct his
splintered armies from across the northern end of the Bulge.
By December 21st,
German forces had Bastogne surrounded on all sides and in spite of repeated
attacks could not take the town. With the Americans low on ammunition and
medical supplies, their position was dire. The German commander now sent an
emissary to induce the acting commander of the 101st Airborne Division
Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe to surrender.
In a moment of irritation and annoyance he
uttered ‘nuts’ which was dutifully transcribed and sent to the German commander
as the reply by his bewildered staff officers. The commander of the 101st
Airborne Division, Major General Maxwell Taylor was meanwhile on an official
engagement in Washington when his Division was called to action in Bastogne.
The American officers
meanwhile had to explain the meaning of ‘nuts’ to the German representative as
meaning a categorical no to the German surrender request. The subsequent German
artillery barrage, though heavy and sustained and for many American soldiers,
the heaviest and most sustained they had ever been through, still failed to
induce surrender. The subsequent German attacks, ferocious though they were,
were unable to breach the Bastogne perimeter in spite of the fact that
McAuliffe’s command post was almost overrun at a time.
Meanwhile by the 23rd
of December the clouds had begun to break, enabling the Allied Air Force to
take to the skies the next day. Thereafter rocket-firing American P-47 Republic
fighters as well as Mustang P-51 fighters began to hit the German armored and
motorized columns forcing the Germans to seek the protection of secondary roads
as relief from the air attacks as well as to out flank the American road
blocks.
These all helped to slowdown and eventually bog
down the German advance which was also increasingly being slowed by fuel
shortages as there were fewer and fewer available fuel dumps as the Allies
either relocated or destroyed the existing fuel dumps as they retreated.
Meanwhile Field
Marshal Montgomery ordered all available British units within the vicinity of
the Meuse River Crossings, whether combat or non-combat units to head to the
Meuse bridge crossings and secure them from the impending German advance and
efforts at crossing the River. Even the British 29th armored Brigade
which had just turned in its tanks for refitting was ordered to take back the
tanks and head to the River crossings alongside XXX corps.
By December 24th
Allied Air power began to take its toll on the German columns while Bastogne
was resupplied with food, medicine and ammunition from the air. The Allied
fighter bombers also began to hit the German supply trucks with devastating
effect. The combined effect of all these
was that the spearhead of the German advance practically ground to a halt a few
miles short of the Meuse River at the best instance.
With the German supply lines stretched to a
breaking point, Allied fighter bombers harassing the supply trucks, and tanks
beginning to run out of fuel, and the Meuse River crossings effectively held by
Allied troops, the German attack ran out of steam, and the momentum began to
shift in the Allies’ favor.
On December 24th
Hasso Von Manteuffel viewing the dire strategic situation, sent a message to
Hitler through his military adjutant advising that all offensive operations be
suspended along with a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler rejected the advice.
Meanwhile elements of Patton’s Third Army namely the hard fighting 37th
tank battalion of the 4th Armored Division had broken through the
German lines and made contact with American troops in Bastogne at 1650 hours on
26th of December ending the siege of Bastogne.
By January 1 in a bid to kick start the
offensive that had ground to a halt, the German Luftwaffe sent in hundreds of
planes in a last ditch effort to destroy Allied Air power, attacking and
destroying on the ground hundreds of Allied
war planes, over 465 aircraft in total. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe sustained over
275 irreplaceable losses some to Allied fighters, but mostly to Allied anti-
air craft guns set up to track and destroy the V – I flying bombs.
On the same day Army Group
G launched an operation against the lines of the US Seventh Army in the south
code-named Operation Nordwind which seriously hurt the men and forces of the Franco-American
7th Seventh Army and forced them to retreat to defensive positions
on the south bank of the Mode River on January 21.
At a time Strasbourg seemed to be in danger of
falling once more to the Germans to the great alarm of the French government as
General Eisenhower briefly considered abandoning the city in the face of the
unrelenting German attacks. It took the heroic defense efforts of the French
units of the 7th Army to save the city.
The German attack finally
petered out by January 15th but with a bulge extending dangerously
into the Allied center. The Allies decided to counterattack to reduce and if
possible cut off the Germans caught in the bulge. For this reason on January 1,
Patton’s Third Army was ordered to attack the salient from the south while
Montgomery was ordered to cut off the bulge from the north in a pincer movement
designed to entrap and capture the German forces in the bulge.
While Patton promptly
initiated his attack on the 1st of January, Montgomery held off his
attacks until January 3 in order to complete his preparations by which time the
German forces sensing the danger began desperately to retreat to escape the
entrapment even without most of their vehicles and heavy equipment. By January
7th, Adolf Hitler finally decided to call off the offensive and withdraw
his force back to their start line. The two tips of the Allied pincer movements
finally closed on January 15th and the battle of the Bulge was
officially over.
Official German losses
including dead, wounded and prisoners of war were over 100,000 while The
Americans sustained over 89,000 casualties including 19,000 confirmed dead with
over 48,000 listed as wounded or missing. The Allies lost over 730 tanks while
The Germans lost over 600 tanks. The fact was that while the Allies could
replace their losses, the Germans could not replace theirs including the 30
reserve divisions that had been held back in Germany to contain the impending Soviet
winter offensive.
When the Soviet armies launched their
offensive on January 12, there were practically no German reserves to stop the
Soviet drive that carried 300 kilometers all the way from the Vistula River in
Poland to the Elbe River in East Prussia, 60 kilometers or one hour drive away
from Berlin in early February 1945. Hitler’s gamble had failed, opening the road
to Berlin to the Allies and the US First Army characteristically led the way.
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