THE FIRST ARMY’S DRIVE TO THE RHINE
With the battle of the
Bulge practically over by the end of January 1945, General Eisenhower now
concentrated on bringing his Five Armies to the Rhine on a broad front. Field
Marshal Montgomery’s request for a northern route-led drive through Germany by
the British 21st Army Group was turned down effectively after the
failure of Operation Market Garden to seize the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem;
and with American troops out numbering the British 4 to 1, the next phase of
the Allied campaign on the Western front was increasingly becoming an American
affair.
The First Army now
advanced to seize the Roer River Dams only to find out that the Germans had
dynamited the dams leading to a deluge of water that flooded the entire plains,
thereby hampering further advances in that sector. It took two full weeks for
the flood to subside enough for the First and Ninth Armies to resume their
advance.
With the subsiding of the flood, First Army
units commenced an advance towards the Rhine in the direction of Cologne. The
momentum built up in the first week of March as the Allied Armies converged on
the left bank of the Rhine preparatory to crossing the great River, the last
natural barrier standing in the way of the Allies as they drove to Berlin
The First Army in the
middle stood on the left bank of the River opposite the great city of Cologne.
As the First Army pressed towards the edge of the River hoping to find a River
crossing, the bridges went down. The German Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler had ordered
the destruction of all bridges across the Rhine to deny the Allies any
opportunity for a quick crossing of the River as the Rhine happened to be the
last natural defensive barrier standing in the way of the Allies.
The German Army in the West counted on the
Rhine as their last hope in stemming the advance of the Allies and Field
Marshal Walter Model commanding the Army Groups in the West sought to fortify
the Western banks against any Allied attempts towards crossing the great River.
Meanwhile the German Dictator, Adolf Hitler had ordered the destruction of all
bridges across the Rhine as the Allied advance drew close to the Rhine River.
As elements of the
retreating German forces streamed across the River many of the bridge crossings
went down, even though some bridge crossings already mined preparatory to being
blown up, were also deemed necessary for the fleeing German forces and vehicles
to cross the River and strengthen the German defences on the east of the Ruhr.
As such, at many points it became a game of chance to see how many Germans
could be safely evacuated to the other side of the River before the bridges
could be blown up in the face of the rapidly advancing Allies.
The American frontline
officers in the First army knew that these opportunities existed and could be
exploited even though their original orders stipulated that they should halt
their advance on the west bank of the Rhine River and not attempt any crossing
until directed from above. Major General William M. Hoges the commander of the 9th
Armored Division of the First Army’s III Corps in particular had been directed
to turn south at Remagen and link up with elements of the Third Army advancing
towards the Rhine.
However in apparent disregard
of the directive and willing to take a chance during Operation Lumberjack,
General Hoges ordered an Armored reconnaissance patrol of the Division to race
to the River right through the line of the retreating German forces hoping to
catch any of the two railroad bridges in that sector’s area intact.
Intelligence had informed him that the Germans were holding onto the two
bridges intact to enable as many elements as possible of the 15th
Army still trapped on the other side to escape capture from the rapidly
advancing Americans fully motorIsed columns.
The first was the Railroad Bridge at Remagen
while the second bridge was at Wesel in today’s North Rhine-Westphalia. Near
the town of Remagen, American forward observation units could see that the old
railroad bridge across the Rhine was still standing, and they could see columns
of German troops, remnants of the battered 15th Army retreating across the River with trains
packed full of wounded soldiers and equipment still crossing.
By early 1945,
American industrial production was at its peak and all elements of its Army in
Europe whether armored or infantry units were fully motorIsed, ensuring that
breakthroughs were exploited at break neck speeds which often bypassed the
largely foot - mobile and horse carriage driven German infantry formations.
This cost the Germans dearly in the retreat towards the Rhine as large bodies
of walking infantry units were simply by passed and abandoned on the west bank
of the Rhine by the mechanized and motorIsed Allied columns.
German Dictator Adolf Hitler, not unmindful of
the speed of the Allied advance had ordered all the Rhine River crossings blown
up in the face of the inexorable Allied advance even when thousands of his men
were still floundering on the other side of the River in late February. Some
daring German officers who saw no reason in leaving men trapped behind Allied
lines, who were desperately needed in the defense of the Fatherland, decided to
take a chance in holding off the demolitions for as long as possible especially
when the 15th Army alone had over 90,000 men still trapped on the
other side of the Rhine when the Bridges demolition order arrived.
On receiving the report about the
still-functional bridge at Remagen the 9th Armored Division’s
commander General Hoges ordered a full reconnaissance patrol to race towards
the bridge as well as ordering the tanks of the 9th Armored Division
to speed ahead to give fire support to the reconnaissance patrol in the
eventuality of a fire fight at the approach of the bridge. On seeing American
motorIsed units approaching the bridge, the German defenders set off an explosive
charge that detonated, lifting the bridge up in the air but failed to destroy
it, as its superstructure settled back in place.
Thereafter three US combat engineers namely
Lieutenant Hugh Mott, Staff Sergeant John Reynolds and Sergeant Eugene Dorland of the 2nd platoon ‘B’ company of
the 9th armored engineer battalion rushed onto the bridge in company
of other supporting infantry men and hastily set about dismantling the
demolition charges and fuses in place, while at the same time, a combat
reconnaissance company led by Sergeant Alexander A Drabik and Lieutenant Karl
H. Timmerman of Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division became
the first NCO and officer respectively to race across the bridge and cross the
Rhine River on the 7th of March 1945 in the face of determined but
sporadic German resistance.
Following the crossing,
the bridge was secured and hasty repairs were effected, enabling the first
Sherman tanks to cross the Rhine. When Lieutenant General Omar N Bradley
cautiously informed General Eisenhower of the capture of the bridge, knowing he
had no orders to cross the Rhine, Ike reportedly excited and dumbfounded by the
news, inquired from Bradley about how many soldiers he had within the vicinity
and how many he could ‘throw’ across the River.
Within twenty four hours over 8,000 soldiers,
tanks and vehicles had been moved across the bridge and a bridge head was built
up to protect the bridge from subsequent
and prolonged German counter attacks in the days and weeks following and
artillery salvoes from long-range guns including a railway gun that were aimed at destroying the bridge.
The furious German
High Command even sent a sortie of their latest Arado Ar 234 Jets to bomb the
bridge which also proved unsuccessful. V-2 rocket attacks were also launched at
the bridge as well as attacks by frogmen and floating mines which all failed.
An attempt to aim long range artillery from a rail way gun at the bridge also
missed.
However on the 17th of March 1945,
after ten days of continually absorbing attacks and crossings by three US Divisions,
the 9th Infantry, 78th Infantry and the 99th
Infantry Division of the US First Army, the bridge suddenly collapsed while
combat engineers were laboring strenuously to weld and strengthen the super
structure. 28 Engineers plunged to their deaths and 93 others were injured.
The capture of the
bridge however proved to be both a tactical and strategic success enabling the
first penetration of Germany beyond the Rhine, even as the eventual collapse of
the bridge was overcome as several pontoon bridges were already in place and
the bridge head had been expanded deep enough for the First Army to carry its assault
into Germany proper.
Following the capture
of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, the First Army was directed to widen and
consolidate its bridgehead while awaiting the crossing of the Rhine by the
other Allied Armies as General Eisenhower had directed that the Allied Armies
advance abreast of each other on a wide front. Field Marshal Montgomery’s bid
and push for an advance on a narrow front by the British led 21st Army group
had by now being rejected in favor of a wide front advance into Germany simultaneously
by all the Three Allied Army Groups operational as of March 1945.
On the night of 22/23rd
March 1945, the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and Nierstein, while
the British 21st Army Group began its well rehearsed crossings on
the 23rd of March 1945, well supported by an intense preparation
involving heavy air attacks, artillery barrage and the landing of two airborne
divisions, the 6th British and 17th US airborne divisions
directly on the enemy positions on the east bank of the Rhine.
Following the break
out from the Rhine, the First Army now operating once more as part of the US 12th
Army group under Lt General Omar N Bradley was ordered to resume its offensive
in the direction of Giessen and the Lahn River, 65 miles east of Remagen on the
morning of the 25th of March. Bradley’s command of the First Army
had been restored at the end of the battle of the Bulge. The First Army now
outflanked the defenses the Germans erected on the east-west Sieg River south
of Cologne where the Germans expected the First Army to attack northwards. In
course of the drive, the three Corps of the First Army then turned northwards
towards Paderborn before linking up with advancing units of the US Ninth Army
under Lt General William H Simpson.
All three Corps of the First Army participated
in the break out, which on the first day involved five infantry and two Armored
Divisions. The US VII Corps faced the stiffest resistance as it had to fully
engage its armored forces to force a gain of 12 miles or 19 kilometers beyond
its line of departure, while the III Corps without committing its armor made a
gain of 4 miles or 6 kilometers. The V Corps on the other hand made a gain of
5-8 miles on the right meeting minimal resistance.
By the next day being
the 26th of March, all three Corps, while advancing shattered the
enemy opposition they came across as they fully deployed their armored strength
advancing over fifty miles beyond their take off point and moving at will in
many instances into enemy rear areas. Organized German resistance had
diminished considerably after the Allies crossed the Rhine. In many instances,
the resistance was nothing more than a hastily mounted road block which the
motorIsed columns easily brushed aside or outflanked as they deemed necessary.
It had become obvious
to the Allied commanders that the Wermacht had dissipated its last remaining
strength in the Battle of the Bulge. By the end of the 28th of March,
Courtney Hodges force had advanced beyond the Lahn River, meeting little
opposition as the enemy offered only sporadic resistance. Soon thereafter,
elements of the First Army had captured Paderborn, 80 miles north of Giessen
and had made contact with elements of the Third Army that were covering their
right flank and were driving down from their beachhead while headed northwest
towards Kassel.
On March 29, a column
of the VII Corp’s 3rd Armored Division equipped with the latest
Pershing M26 heavy tanks led the advance to Paderborn with an attached Infantry
Regiment of the 104th Division on its flank while the rest of the
104th Infantry followed closely, enabling the task force to hold any
grounds gained. By so doing the task force advanced over 45 miles or 72
kilometers without meeting any serious opposition.
They spent the night at a point about 24
kilometers to Paderborn and the following day resumed the advance, only to
immediately run into stiff opposition from elements of a German training school
cadets of an SS Panzer replacement Depot equipped with over sixty tanks who
held up the advance of the task force all day. On being informed about the
problem, Major General J Lawton Collins commander of the VII Corps requested
that General Simpson’s Ninth Army provide some help.
General Simpson now requested a Combat Command
of the 2nd Armored Division which had just advanced to Beckum to
make a 15 mile (24kilometers) advance south eastward to Lippstadt midway
between Beckum and the spearhead of the 3rd Armored held up by the
resisting German forces. By so doing the advance spearheads of the First and
Ninth Armies met up, sealing the Ruhr industrial Region, encircling Field
Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B within the American lines of advance.
Although encircled, Army Group B made
desperate efforts to break through to the east but these moves were easily
repulsed by the vastly superior American forces. With First Army holding up
about two thirds of the pocket while the Ninth Army held on to the other one
third, the pocket was consistently squeezed through concentric attacks by both
Armies so that by the 13th of April the pocket had been split in two
between the First and the Ninth Armies.
The First Army’s attack northward was led by
the First Army’s III Corp on the 5th of April supplemented on 6th
of April by attacks of the XVIII Corp of the American Airborne Army that had
been reassigned to General Courtney Hodges after the conclusion of Operation Varsity;
the British 21st Army Group’s crossing of the Rhine River. The IV
and V Corp of the First Army pressed the attack east ward.
The Ninth Army cleared the northern end of the
pocket while the attacks of the 8th Infantry Division’s XVIII Corp
of the First Army further split the southern section into two by reaching the
southern bank of the Ruhr River. By April 16th - 18th,
German opposition had collapsed and the rest of the German units fell in as
prisoners and the fighting ceased.
The resulting encirclement led to the
destruction of Army Group B the last major German force holding up the Allies
in the West. When the final prisoner count of over 325,000 men was completed,
the largest on the Western Front, Field Marshal Model was unaccounted for,
presumably a suicide case. With the reduction of the Ruhr pocket and the
destruction of Army Group B, the advance in the West predictably turned to a
pursuit as the German forces still in the field were increasingly unable to
halt the Allied advances all across the west.
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