BLOOD, FIRE AND STEEL, 150 YEARS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY ; WW1 THE NORTH ATLANTIC 1916-1917

THE NORTH ATLANTIC CAMPAIGN JANUARY 1916 - 1917

On the sea, controversy raged over the effectiveness of Germany’s submarine warfare against the British trade lines. German Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Scherer and General Falkenhayn seemed to both agree that restricted submarine warfare in deference to America’s interests was preventing the German Navy from gaining the upper hand on the High Seas.

While the civilian staff of the foreign office were urging for restraint so as not to provoke the US into joining the Allies, the military leaders were pushing for an unrestricted submarine warfare policy. Between February 14 and May 1917, a policy of unrestricted warfare was permitted but soon stopped again.

With the support of Paul Hindenburg, the new Chief of Staff, the leaders of the military establishment were winning grounds in their push for unrestricted submarine warfare and when the Civilian leaders came to believe that Britain’s policy of blockade at sea would eventually starve Germany before a military victory could be achieved, the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare was soon adopted again by February 1917.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

The summer of 1916, saw the long deferred confrontation between the world’s most powerful navies; the German High Seas fleet and Great Britain’s Grand Fleet in the battle of Jutland involving over 250 warships. Admiral Reinhardt Schumer took over command of the German High seas fleet and initiated a plan he hoped would split the British fleet in a naval confrontation that could give Germany a chance of victory.

 His plans consisted of drawing a portion of the Grand fleet to a position midway between the British coast and the Norwegian coast and destroy it before any reinforcements could get to the battlefield from the main fleet base at Scapa Flow. In that way he hoped to destroy the Royal Navy in piece meal engagements rather than a direct confrontation headlong with the main fleet.

The ambush was to be set by five battle cruisers of the Germans High seas fleet together with four light cruisers which were to sail northward under Hipper’s command from William Shaven, Germany to a point off the south western coast of Norway and roughly half way  across the planned movement route of the German fleet.

However, the signal for the start of the operation was intercepted and deciphered by the British Admiralty which decided to engage the whole fleet in the exercise. At 2:20 pm on May 31^st, 1916 when the main squadrons of the British fleet were still 65 miles away to the north from the point of the ambush, Beatty’s advance guard of light cruisers that were five miles ahead of his heavier ships and German Admiral Hipper’s scouting group discovered each other’s presence.

 Within an hour, the battle lines were drawn and the fighting began. In 50 minutes, the British inflicted such severe damages on the German ships that Hipper had to set up a protective screen around his warships with destroyers sent forward in a suicidal torpedo charge that sank the British battle cruiser, the Queen Mary.

At 4:35 pm, a British patrol sighted the main German fleet and an alerted Beatty steamed up towards where the Grand fleet was. When Beatty’s forces finally linked up with the main fleet under Admiral Jellicoe fifteen minutes later, the main German fleet came into view.

The Grand fleet just had enough time to turn side wards so as to bring their combined broad sides to bear on the approaching German fleet in what is known in naval parlance as the “Crossing of the T” i.e. when a fleet’s broadside guns are brought to bear on an approaching fleet which in response can only bring their forward guns to bear in frontal motion.

By so doing, the British had many more guns in action compared to the Germans who relied only on their forward guns aloft the stern of the ship. The Germans however were saved by the sturdy nature of their ships, excellent seamanship and the poor nature of the British shells.

Though repeatedly hit, their ships survived and fought hard enough to sink a British battle ship “The Invincible”. Admiral Scherer ordered his fleet out of the trap by executing an 180^o turn maneuver. This was flawlessly accomplished, but he found out that his ships had been cut off from their escape route back home by the Grand fleet that had somehow come in between them, and was attacking furiously.

To save his fleet, Admiral Scherer ordered a charge of his destroyers and Battle Cruisers against the main British fleet with a view to giving him the chance to escape. Jellicoe in a moment of fear and panic, desperate to save his ships from the expected deluge of torpedoes from the destroyers ordered the fleet to turn away from the approaching German ships.

 By so doing, the two fleets steered away from each other with the Germans destroyers laying a protective screen of smoke that hid the fleet from the sight of the British Admirals. By this time, it was 7:35pm and darkness was setting in. Taking advantage of the darkness, the Germans fleet escaped and steamed home to its home ports in the Baltic Sea. The German fleet thus escaped destruction as Jellicoe’s fleet could not find the German fleet in the dark.

At the end of the battle, the British lost more ships and men than the Germans; three battle cruisers, three cruisers, eight destroyers and 6,274 officers and men, while the Germans lost one battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, five destroyers and 2,545  officers and men. 

The loses did not affect the British superiority in terms of warships over the German navy; and the strategic fact was that the German navy remained bottled up at its home ports and never ventured out to confront the British Grand fleet for the rest of the war.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION