BLOOD, FIRE AND STEEL ; THE WESTERN FRONT 1916

THE WESTERN FRONT 1916

Whereas in 1914, the center of gravity of the war had been on the western front, in 1915, it shifted to the East and in 1916, it moved once more back to France. The operations in the Dardanelles, Salonika and Mesopotamia had made a drain on the Allied resources but for Great Britain where conscription by virtue of the military service act of January 1916, had brought in additional 36 divisions; the Allies were ready once more to breach the Germans trench lines in France.

An Allied military conference was called in December 1915, in France in Marshal Joffre’s office involving military leaders of Great Britain, France, Russia, Belgium and Italy. It was agreed that a coordinated joint offensive was to be launched in 1916. Eventually counteraction by Germany precluded a coordinated offensive and in the event, only the British were to embark on the offensive.

Falkenhayn, the Germans Chief of Staff had come to a conclusion that Russia was no longer a credible threat and Italy had become ineffectual. His resolution centered on bringing a decisive blow on France after which Britain’s role in the field would be neutralized and thereafter she would be dealt with at sea by submarines.

Falkenhyans’ preferred method of dealing with France was through a process of battles of attrition in which he hoped to bleed France to the point of surrender on the battle field.  His plan involved choosing a strong point to attack against which predictably France would pour in its manpower in defense.

He chose the fortress city of Verdun on the Franco-German border with its complex series of forts and strongholds. He knew that for reasons of national pride and prestige, France would defend Verdun to the last man and there he determined, he would bleed the French Army of their prime in manhood.

Falkenhyans tactical plan involved setting up a concentric ring of heavy and medium range artillery around the city of Verdun and its fortresses on the North and East and then to stage a series of military advances on the city and the fortresses, knowing that assuredly French infantry would pour in to defend and recapture the forts.

These then would be pulverized by the field guns he had placed in vantage positions around the city. In addition, each German infantry surge would be preceded by a brief but intense bombardment meant to clear the target area of defenders.

Although the French had early intelligence warning of the oncoming offensive, the French High command was preoccupied with its own offensive plans and failed to prepare adequately. At 7:15am on February 21, 1916 the heaviest German bombardment of the war began on a stretch of eight miles around Verdun. That evening by 4:45 pm German infantry began to advance and fort after fort began to fall.

Henri Philippe Pétain

Henri Pétain took control of the French command at the Battle of Verdun in 1916. He was also in charge of restoring order when French troops held a mutiny in 1917.

Culver Pictures

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When the Germans began to attack both the west and east bank of the River Meuse, the French came to appreciate the gravity of the situation. To relieve the pressure on the French, the Russians launched an attack on the eastern front around Lake Naroch, while the Italians began their fifth offensive on the Isonzo and the British simultaneously took over control of the western front all the way from the Arras sector to Ypres southward of the Somme.

General Philippe Petain was assigned the defense of Verdun and this he performed gallantly, keeping the main road along which supplies were delivered open, even under the intense fire of the heavy field guns of the German army.

Though the bloodshed was horrendous, the Germans meanwhile kept pressing forward, taking one fort after the other in their grim advance, finally almost taking Belleville, the last stronghold before the city of Verdun itself. Petain was about to evacuate the east bank of the Meuse when British forces finally launched their assault.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The Germans generally accomplished their plan of attrition warfare in Verdun and the plan truly did bleed the French army and helped to somehow demoralize and weaken the French as was revealed in France’s later weak resolve to confront Germany resolutely in the next round of hostilities as was seen in the debacle of June 1940, during the 2^nd world war.

 Pressure on the French in Verdun was only let up when the British launched the offensive that came to be known as the 2^nd battle of the Somme. It was pretty clear that British General Douglas Haig taking advantage of the increasing number of British infantry divisions on the field, had also decided to resort to the process of attrition to bleed the German army because the strategic value of the second battle of the Somme has been difficult to apprehend in retrospect on a tactical if not strategic level.

World War I Tank

A Mark IV tank, a British tank that was used in service in 1917, traverses the battlefield during World War I. Tanks were first used in the war by the British during the First Battle of the Somme in 1916. However, tanks did not become effective in battle until the next year, when their design was improved.

Imperial War Museum

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 For French Marshall Joffre, the second battle of the Somme was strategic only in that it helped to ease the pressure the Germans were putting on the French in Verdun. As ferocious as the attacks the British infantry exerted on the German lines were, it was difficult to apprehend the strategic motive behind that major offensive and the resulting bloodshed.

The offensive was launched on July 1^st, 1916 under the command of Gen Emile Fayolle and General Sir Henry Seymour Rawlinson who were opposed by German General Fritz Von Below. French General Fayolle could only muster three divisions for the assault astride the Somme River but because of his strength in artillery, he was able to secure his objective for the day.

The British 13^th corps on the French left did equally well but that was all. The main body of the British infantry ran into a fire storm and a web of dug in defenses that cost them casualties of about 60,000 in one day of battle; a record unequalled in British history. Haig was constrained to pressing on in a theater of operation where he had initially enjoyed some success.

German Casualties at Somme

On July 1, 1916, the British launched an offensive to try to divert German troops who were fighting the French at the Battle of Verdun. The British targeted their attack along the Somme River in northern France. On the first day, 60,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded, or captured. When the attack halted in November, the Allies and the Germans had each suffered more than 600,000 casualties.

Hulton Deutsch

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 He formed a new army called the fifth army under Lt. Gen Sir Hubert de la Poe Gough for a holding operation on the Acre River. The Germans did likewise putting General Max von Kollwitz in command of a new army south of the Somme. The battle raged for weeks ferociously without any side gaining a significant breakthrough.

 On August 29, Falkenhyans was relieved of his command by a visibly displeased German Emperor. Hindenburg was appointed in his place with Ludendorff as his deputy. On September 15^th, the British launched a general attack on a 10 mile front. Thirty six tanks were used for the first time in this operation with considerable success.

 However, because so many lives were lost and not much was accomplished in military terms, the battle of the Somme’s came to be regarded as a strategic blunder and a meat grinder. In  retrospect it has become obvious that the German General Staff came to a realization at this point that outright victory on the Western front was becoming more of a mirage and they began to increasingly look to the Eastern front for a decisive break through.

 The bloody impasse eventually cost French General Joffre and British General Haigh their positions as both of them were replaced in December 1916. The casualties for the British were 420,000, French 195,000 and 650,000 Germans. In all, 95 Germans divisions, 55 British divisions and 20 French divisions were involved.

1917 began on a note of promise following the appeals for peace from US President Woodrow Wilson, Pope Benedict XV and the new Austro-Hungarian Emperor Charles 1. The belligerents were unwilling to bulge. Wilson had appealed to the warring countries to accept peace without victory.

 He demanded terms of peace and a statement of war aims from all the belligerents. The Central Powers disclosed none, and the Allies sent in terms that were so unacceptable that his mediation role lapsed into irrelevance.

Interestingly, three months later, President Wilson was to lead the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. What prompted US intervention was the proclamation by the German government of a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic beginning January 31^st, 1917.

Battle of the Argonne

A machine-gun nest is set up by the Allied forces to blast the Germans in the Battle of the Argonne in France in 1918. This large-scale offensive destroyed highly fortified German defense positions in western Europe, forcing the Germans to accept an armistice.

Corbis

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America’s entry did not immediately change the strategic situation as the country was not yet fully mobilized, but her vast navy brought succor to the Allies in extending their capacity for anti-submarine operations. By June 5^th, 34 American destroyers were based on Queenstown (now Cobh) from which they joined in the anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic.

THE EASTERN FRONT 1916

In the hope of diverting German strength from the attack at Verdun on the western front and under pressure from the Western Allies, the Russians boldly but unwisely opened an offensive north and south of Lake Nar chest at Vilna on March 18, 1916 and continued until March 27 winning some territory at great cost and even then the gains were to be of a temporary nature.

The Russians then planned a major offensive for July. The main blow was meant to be delivered by AE Evertad’s army corps assisted by an internal movement of AN Kropotkin’s army in the southwestern front which was ordered to feign a diversionary attack to cover the main attack. Interestingly, Brusilow’s offensive turned out to be the main attack.

Urged on by the Italians to launch an offensive to counter Austria’s Asiago offensive in May, the Russians once more launched a major attack that turned out to be their last major offensive in the war.

 The offensive initially began well as Brusilow’s four armies were dispersed along a very wide front reaching to Lutsk at the Northern end; Ternopol and Bichat in the central sector and Czernowitz at the southern end. Having struck first in Ternopol and Czernowitz sectors on June 4, Brusilov on June 5 took the Austrians wholly by surprise when he launched AM Kaledins army towards Lutsk.

The defenses gave way and the attackers pushed in between two Austrian armies. As this offensive gained momentum, the Russians penetrated further in the Buchach sector and their advance into Bukovina resulted in the capture of Czernowitz alongside 200,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war.

 The offensive was however hampered by the refusal of Generals Evert and Kropotkin to coordinate their strikes as agreed upon. An attempt by the Russian Chief of General Staff MV Alekseev to transfer the reserve forces of these inept Generals came too late to stop the Germans from reinforcing the Austrians and capitalize on the late arrival of the reserves.

Brusilov’s advance however got to the Carpathian Mountains but thereafter was checked by a German counter strike under General Alexander von Vlissingen’s army in the Lutsk sector. Further efforts by the Russians were launched in July but the opportunity to capitalize on the advances was lost.

Brusilov’s advance had driven the Austrians from Bukovina and much of Eastern Galicia and had inflicted huge losses of men and materials on them but he had also cost Russia, casualties of over one million men.

Although Brusilov’s victory decimated the Austrians, Russia seemed to lose more in terms of men and materials as the loss of over one million men became too much for the country to bear, even though most were deserters and prisoners.

Brusilov’s offensive also had an indirect result of great consequence. First it had compelled the Germans to withdraw seven divisions from the Western front, where they could ill afford to spare them from the battles of Verdun and the Somme. Secondly it paved the way for Romania’s unfortunate entry into the war.

Romania in utter disregard of her military weakness and unpreparedness had yielded to the Allies’ entreaty to enter the war against the Central Powers with offers of land and territorial gains and the belief that the Central Powers would not have time to look her way. By so doing, she launched an attack with 12 out of 23 divisions against the Austro-Hungarians who could muster only five divisions.

The counter measures of the Central Powers proved to be more devastating than the Romanian attack, as the Germans mustered five divisions alongside two Austrian divisions under Malkensen’s at the orders of Falkenhayn who though relieved of his overall command had this particular plan of his approved.

Malkensen’s forces operating from Bulgaria stormed the Turtucaia (Tutraken) bridge head on the Danube Southeast of Bucharest on the 5^th of September. His subsequent advance eastward caused the Romanians to abandon their main advance in pursuit of the Bulgarian offensive.

 Falkenhayn now a direct field commander after his being relieved as the German Chief of staff attacked the Romanians at the southern end of the 200 mile front where he threw one of the Romanian columns back into the Roter Tuvin pass; by October 9 he had defeated another Romanian army at Kroonstad.

For a month however the Romanians resisted the German armies’ attempt to drive them out of the Vukan and Surduc passes into Walachia. However just before winter snow could block their way; the Germans took the two passes and advanced southward into Torgu jiu which they also held.

At this point Malkensen’s attacks converged with that of Falkenhayn on the Bulgarian lines westward from Dobruja after crossing the Danube near Bucharest. Bucharest fell on the 16^th of December together with the rest of the Romanian troops in it. The victory gave the Central Powers control over Romanian’s wheat field and oil wells while eventually giving the Russians 300 more miles to defend as a result of the Bulgarian collapse.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC CAMPAIGN 1916-JANUARY 1917

On the sea, controversy raged over the effectiveness of Germany’s submarine warfare against the British trade lines. German Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Scherer and General Falkenhayn seemed to both agree that restricted submarine warfare in deference to America’s interests was preventing the German Navy from gaining the upper hand on the High Seas.

While the civilian staff of the foreign office were urging for restraint so as not to provoke the US into joining the Allies, the military leaders were pushing for an unrestricted submarine warfare policy. Between February 14 and May 1917, a policy of unrestricted warfare was permitted but soon stopped again.