Friday, 2 May 2014

BLOOD, FIRE AND STEEL; EFFECT OF THE WAR ON EUROPE IN 1919








EFFECT OF THE WAR ON EUROPE, 1919




The celebrations and jubilation that marked the end of World War 1 testified to the relief  Europeans felt about the end of the most costly and destructive conflict ever on the European continent. That the war ended with the defeat of Germany and the other Central powers did not in itself extinguish all the flash points of conflicts that then existed.

The total remaking of the political and economic landscape that ensued with the collapse of four dynasties; the Romanovs, the Hapsburg Empire, the Kaiser of Germany and the Ottoman Turks dynasty was so widespread that not a single peace conference could set Europe back on its feet.

The drastic change in the power equation particularly in Central and Eastern Europe left many pondering as to what the future will be like. The revolutionary terror in Russia was threatening to spill to other parts of Europe and the old order was greatly threatened with change.

With over 8.5 million people dead, over 21 million wounded and property damage exceeding $236 billion dollars, the impetus for a lasting peace was fragile as nations sought to recover or exact vengeance as the case maybe against their perceived aggressors. The war also strengthened the nationalistic yearnings of the European colonies and at the same time considerably strengthened the US and Japan vis a vis Europe.

The Paris peace conference ultimately produced five treaties, each named after the locality and city in which it was signed. The treaty of Versailles with Germany, June 28th 1919, the treaty of Saint German with Austria September 10th 1919, the treaty of Trianon with Hungary, June 4th 1920 in addition to the Washington naval conference and limitations treaty signed by the great powers to curb a naval arms race in 1921 -22.

The Wilsonian vision captured in the fourteen peace points saved   to give direction to a new world order subtly superintended by the U.S, the greatest economic beneficiary of the  now- over conflict and whose honest brokerage served to lessen tensions and create promise of a more just emerging world order.

The British and French had reservations about Wilson's grand vision for a new world order founded on the tenets of democracy, the rule of law and equality of nations. Being Colonial powers, they were not comfortable with certain notions of justice and equality that Wilson proclaimed.

That Wilson's ideals and dreams did not resonate with his own home turf, the US electorate which rewarded him with the loss of the US Senate to Republican control and took the moral and political initiative from Wilson's unilateralist’s approach but even then the reality did not yet dawn on him.

Liberal internationalism set the pace for the Paris peace conference, and the European statesmen borrowing from Wilson's example quickly learned to proclaim the justice of their cause rather than the political benefit accruing from it.

In the words of encyclopedia Britannica “yet Wilson's principles proved one by one to be inappropriate irrelevant, or insufficient in the eyes of European governments, while the idealistic gloss they placed on the treaty undermined their legitimacy for anyone claiming that 'justice” had not been served.''

Wilson's personality must bear some of the blame for this disillusionment, He was a proud man, confident of his objectivity and prestige and he insisted on being the first US president to sail to Europe and to conduct negotiations himself. He had visited Europe only twice before as a tourist and now delayed the peace conference in order to make a triumphant tour of European capitals.

Moreover the democrats lost their majority in the elections of November 1918, yet Wilson's refusal to include prominent republicans in his delegation. This allowed Theodore Roosevelt to declare that Wilson had “absolutely no authority to speak for the American people”. Wilson's flaws exacerbated the difficulty of promoting his ideals in Paris and at Rome. Still he was a prophet in world politics both as law giver and seer. Only a peace between equals he said can last.

For the French, President George Clemenceau at 77 who began his political career in 1871 during the German Siege at Paris, his assessment of the situation and Wilson's grandeur and opulent vision was at best cynical. He recognized France as the leading arbiter and enforcer as well as victim of whatever went right or wrong at the peace conference considering its territorial congruity with Germany.

Having suffered the most damage, the greatest casualties and biggest financial burden, any vision that pointed to a resurrected Germany did not stand at par with France's view and it therefore watched with mild consternation, the attempts of Wilson to recreate an equal and a just world in which France could easily become the victim of a resurrected Germany.

France's vision lay around reconstructing a new world order in which Germany could no longer threaten her especially as her old ally Russia was no longer available, the need to reconstruct her devastated regions and the need to pay off her war debts. Knowing that ultimately France would have to bear the immediate responsibility for enforcing the peace, her economic recovery from the war had to be accomplished quickly either with the help of Britain and America or a harsher treatment of Germany.

Britain on the other hand was a moderating force between the United States and France but was also pursuing a liberal approach to the issues of international relations. On the one hand while endeavoring to protect the balance of power in favor of both Britain and France; British Prime Minister Lloyd George also sought to ensure the recovery of a united and healthy Germany to counterbalance the emergent status of France as the dominant power in Europe.

In-deference to a stern demand by British public opinion for harsh treatment of the Kaiser and of Germany as a whole Lloyd George's government took the toughest stand on the issue of German reparations in order to cushion Britain's' own financial difficulties and at the same time pushed for a ban on German naval rearmament and partition of her colonies.

Italy also a financially exhausted power was more concerned with securing favorable terms concerning all its land borders as well as securing the stability of the government that was under threat from extremists groups like Benito Mussolini's party that seemed to be gaining ground politically.

 The proprietary of Wilson's' position also became a subject of intense debate in the Italian parliament in early 1919 culminating in the firm demand that all Italian territorial demands be settled except for the issue of the entire Dalmatian constituency.



Russia after World War 1



Meanwhile Russia after the war was slipping into a civil was pitting the Lenin's Bolshevik regime against the anticommunist, pro status quo whites who were bent on restoring the Monarchy to Russia. The Allies meanwhile reacting to the war policies of the Bolshevik government particularly the ill fated Brest – Litvosk treaty and the summary execution of the Romanov Royal family had pitched their tents on the side of the whites hoping that the Communist insurrection could be reversed.

To compound matters, IV Lenin’s revolutionary appeals to Communists all over Europe and beyond to work together to overthrow the existing political orders in his appeal to European socialists to form the third international communist (Comintern) movement hardened the West against the Communist regime.

His appeal coming in January 1919 at a time the Paris peace conference was in full swing and an attempt was being made to reach out to Soviet Russia left a bad taste in the mouth of the Allied governments. To appeal for the overthrow of governments with whom you desire normal relations was antithetical or best an irony. Fortunately the European socialists, deploring the Soviet Bolshevik s' violent style shunned the call.

An attempt by the Big Three Allies to mediate a ceasefire initiative peace talks between the Russians Bolsheviks (Reds) and the anti – communist forces (the Whites) was sabotaged by the refusal of both parties to turn up for the requested meeting or even honor the truce demanded by the American president.

Pressure was also mounted on Wilson by Winston Churchill the erstwhile First Sea Lord and now a member of Lloyd George's   war cabinet for a vigorous Allied operation against the Reds. The war-weary Allies inevitably declined the request.

President Wilson then mandated his special aide on Russian affairs Colonel House to appoint an aide to travel to Russia to hold direct talks with Lenin. For this purpose a young American liberal, William Bullit was thus appointed. Bullit reached Petrograd on March 8th 1919, had a direct meeting with Chechen and Litvinov and from there proceeded to Moscow where he held talks with Lenin.

IV Lenin offered an immediate ceasefire and negotiations in return for the cessation of Allied occupation, support for the Whites and the lifting of the blockade on the Bolsheviks regime. In addition the Bolsheviks offered amnesty to all Russians who had collaborated with the Allies. Bullit returned to Paris excited about the breakthroughs he had only to be denied access to Wilson and to find the conference bogged down over the issue of the Rhineland.

At the same time, Lloyd George was under pressure from his party men. The party was not in a mood to make any conciliatory gestures to Lenin particularly after the Hungarian Communists launched a coup in Bela and Communists in Bavaria declared a Soviet style Republic. The Bavarian Communists were later deposed by the German Federal Army and the Romanian Army chased Kan’s government in Bela away when they entered Hungary on May 1st 1919.

In retrospect many have sought to see whether the Bullit mission could have given the Allies a line of escape from the crises in Russia considering the fact that the Reds won eventually. The fact remained that the Allies still balked at any move that was to be translated as direct support for the Bolsheviks and to compound matters when summoned before the US senate committee on foreign affairs testified against the Versailles treaty against the backdrop of his non-reception by Wilson after his arduous trip to Russia.

The only other direct intervention of the allies in Russia followed the appeal by Herbert Hoover the director of the Europe food relief project for urgent allied intervention in providing food for millions of Russians in distress. The failure of the Bolshevik government to grant allied terms of intervention namely access to Russia’s internal transportation did not ultimately defer the program from a massive intervention that saved many Russian lives.

The failure of the peace conference to make peace amongst Russia’s warring groups meant that the crises were going to be settled militarily. By May 1919 Admiral Kolchak’s White army reached the peak of its offensive power as it drove back the reds and was soon close to Moscow. At this point the Western Allies solidified their support for the group with President Wilson calling on Kolchak to pledge the democratization of Russia, should he win.

In the vent, the Reds turned back the Whites in the summer while the Allies withdrew from their positions in Arkhangelsk in the north on September 30th 1919 after a few clashes with Red army soldiers and also from Murmansk on October 12th 1919.

The battles of the Russian civil war involved armies fighting on a very big territory with hundreds of miles to travel and it therefore    became a question of who could control the internal communication lines, particularly the railways which the Reds proved adept at managing.

 With their famous passion for discipline and sacrifice, the communists were able to improvise supplies that outlasted their opponents and thus were able to sustain a counter offensive that soon saw them overrunning Kiev which had been occupied by White forces under Denikin.

Kolchak’s forces were forced into a retreat that culminated in the capture of his base at Omsk in November 1919. In the meantime Poland under the rule of Marshal Josef Pilsudski view a grand dream of creating a polish Lithuanian – Ukrainian empire declared war on Russia in April 25th 1920 and succeeded in capturing Kier on May 7th. The Soviets however turned the tables on him in June 11th 1920 and even went on to capture Vilnius July 15th and was soon almost overrunning Warsaw itself.

However with the tactical advice of French General Maxime Weygand, the Poles drove back the overextended Reds and captured over 66,000 prisoners along with a huge swathe of Belorussian land. The resulting treaty with Russia fixed the Russian border just to the west of Minsk and for to the east of the Curzon line.

With the constraints of war with Poland removed, the Red army now turned round to free the … from the Whites under Wrangell on November 14 1921. Soviet forces then drove deep into the Caucasus setting up satellite regimes in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan contrast to their initial anti – imperialist stand.

The Soviets thus sought to subjugate all the former Russian territories that had been freed in the aftermath of the October 1917 Revolution. The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was thus inaugurated on December 30th 1921.

The new Soviet Russia that arose had shed the Tsarist Russian territories of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia, but the rest of Russia remained intact under the new communist rulers who now in turn faced a West that was decidedly hostile to its ideologies and strategies of dominion.

No comments:

Post a Comment