THE WESTERN FRONT
1916
Whereas in 1914, the center of gravity of the war had
been on the western front, in 1915, it shifted to the East and in 1916, it
moved once more back to France. The operations in the Dardanelles, Salonika and
Mesopotamia had made a drain on the Allied resources but for Great Britain
where conscription by virtue of the military service act of January 1916, had
brought in additional 36 divisions; the Allies were ready once more to breach
the Germans trench lines in France.
An Allied military conference was called in December 1915,
in France in Marshal Joffre’s office involving military leaders of Great
Britain, France, Russia, Belgium and Italy. It was agreed that a coordinated
joint offensive was to be launched in 1916. Eventually counteraction by Germany
precluded a coordinated offensive and in the event, only the British were to
embark on the offensive.
Falkenhayn, the Germans Chief of Staff had come to a
conclusion that Russia was no longer a credible threat and Italy had become
ineffectual. His resolution centered on bringing a decisive blow on France
after which Britain’s role in the field would be neutralized and thereafter she
would be dealt with at sea by submarines.
Falkenhyans’ preferred method of dealing with France was
through a process of battles of attrition in which he hoped to bleed France to the
point of surrender on the battle field. His plan involved choosing a strong point to
attack against which predictably France would pour in its manpower in defense.
He chose the fortress city of Verdun on the Franco-German
border with its complex series of forts and strongholds. He knew that for
reasons of national pride and prestige, France would defend Verdun to the last
man and there he determined, he would bleed the French Army of their prime in
manhood.
Falkenhyans tactical plan involved setting up a
concentric ring of heavy and medium range artillery around the city of Verdun
and its fortresses on the North and East and then to stage a series of military
advances on the city and the fortresses, knowing that assuredly French infantry
would pour in to defend and recapture the forts.
These then would be pulverized by the field guns he had
placed in vantage positions around the city. In addition, each German infantry
surge would be preceded by a brief but intense bombardment meant to clear the
target area of defenders.
Although the French had early intelligence warning of the
oncoming offensive, the French High command was preoccupied with its own
offensive plans and failed to prepare adequately. At 7:15am on February 21,
1916 the heaviest German bombardment of the war began on a stretch of eight
miles around Verdun. That evening by 4:45 pm German infantry began to advance
and fort after fort began to fall.
Henri Philippe Pétain
Henri Pétain took control
of the French command at the Battle of Verdun in 1916. He was also in charge of
restoring order when French troops held a mutiny in 1917.
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When the Germans began to attack both the west and east
bank of the River Meuse, the French came to appreciate the gravity of the
situation. To relieve the pressure on the French, the Russians launched an
attack on the eastern front around Lake Naroch, while the Italians began their
fifth offensive on the Isonzo and the British simultaneously took over control
of the western front all the way from the Arras sector to Ypres southward of
the Somme.
General Philippe Petain was assigned the defense of
Verdun and this he performed gallantly, keeping the main road along which
supplies were delivered open, even under the intense fire of the heavy field
guns of the German army.
Though the bloodshed was horrendous, the Germans
meanwhile kept pressing forward, taking one fort after the other in their grim
advance, finally almost taking Belleville, the last stronghold before the city
of Verdun itself. Petain was about to evacuate the east bank of the Meuse when
British forces finally launched their assault.
THE BATTLE OF THE
SOMME
The Germans generally accomplished their plan of attrition
warfare in Verdun and the plan truly did bleed the French army and helped to
somehow demoralize and weaken the French as was revealed in France’s later weak
resolve to confront Germany resolutely in the next round of hostilities as was
seen in the debacle of June 1940, during the 2nd world war.
Pressure on the
French in Verdun was only let up when the British launched the offensive that
came to be known as the 2nd battle of the Somme. It was pretty clear
that British General Douglas Haig taking advantage of the increasing number of
British infantry divisions on the field, had also decided to resort to the
process of attrition to bleed the German army because the strategic value of
the second battle of the Somme has been difficult to apprehend in retrospect on
a tactical if not strategic level.
World War I Tank
A Mark IV tank, a British
tank that was used in service in 1917, traverses the battlefield during World
War I. Tanks were first used in the war by the British during the First Battle
of the Somme in 1916. However, tanks did not become effective in battle until
the next year, when their design was improved.
Imperial War Museum
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For French
Marshall Joffre, the second battle of the Somme was strategic only in that it
helped to ease the pressure the Germans were putting on the French in Verdun.
As ferocious as the attacks the British infantry exerted on the German lines
were, it was difficult to apprehend the strategic motive behind that major
offensive and the resulting bloodshed.
The offensive was launched on July 1st, 1916
under the command of Gen Emile Fayolle and General Sir Henry Seymour Rawlinson
who were opposed by German General Fritz Von Below. French General Fayolle could
only muster three divisions for the assault astride the Somme River but because
of his strength in artillery, he was able to secure his objective for the day.
The British 13th corps on the French left did
equally well but that was all. The main body of the British infantry ran into a
fire storm and a web of dug in defenses that cost them casualties of about
60,000 in one day of battle; a record unequalled in British history. Haig was constrained
to pressing on in a theater of operation where he had initially enjoyed some
success.
German Casualties at
Somme
On July 1, 1916, the
British launched an offensive to try to divert German troops who were fighting
the French at the Battle of Verdun. The British targeted their attack along the
Somme River in northern France. On the first day, 60,000 British soldiers were
killed, wounded, or captured. When the attack halted in November, the Allies
and the Germans had each suffered more than 600,000 casualties.
Hulton Deutsch
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He formed a new
army called the fifth army under Lt. Gen Sir Hubert de la Poe Gough for a holding
operation on the Acre River. The Germans did likewise putting General Max von Kollwitz
in command of a new army south of the Somme. The battle raged for weeks
ferociously without any side gaining a significant breakthrough.
On August 29, Falkenhyans
was relieved of his command by a visibly displeased German Emperor. Hindenburg
was appointed in his place with Ludendorff as his deputy. On September 15th,
the British launched a general attack on a 10 mile front. Thirty six tanks were
used for the first time in this operation with considerable success.
However, because
so many lives were lost and not much was accomplished in military terms, the
battle of the Somme’s came to be regarded as a strategic blunder and a meat grinder.
In retrospect it has become obvious that
the German General Staff came to a realization at this point that outright
victory on the Western front was becoming more of a mirage and they began to
increasingly look to the Eastern front for a decisive break through.
The bloody impasse
eventually cost French General Joffre and British General Haigh their positions
as both of them were replaced in December 1916. The casualties for the British
were 420,000, French 195,000 and 650,000 Germans. In all, 95 Germans divisions,
55 British divisions and 20 French divisions were involved.
1917 began on a note of promise following the appeals for
peace from US President Woodrow Wilson, Pope Benedict XV and the new
Austro-Hungarian Emperor Charles 1. The belligerents were unwilling to bulge.
Wilson had appealed to the warring countries to accept peace without victory.
He demanded terms
of peace and a statement of war aims from all the belligerents. The Central
Powers disclosed none, and the Allies sent in terms that were so unacceptable
that his mediation role lapsed into irrelevance.
Interestingly, three months later, President Wilson was to
lead the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. What prompted US
intervention was the proclamation by the German government of a policy of
unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic beginning January 31st,
1917.
Battle of the Argonne
A machine-gun nest is set
up by the Allied forces to blast the Germans in the Battle of the Argonne in
France in 1918. This large-scale offensive destroyed highly fortified German
defense positions in western Europe, forcing the Germans to accept an
armistice.
Corbis
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America’s entry did not immediately change the strategic
situation as the country was not yet fully mobilized, but her vast navy brought
succor to the Allies in extending their capacity for anti-submarine operations.
By June 5th, 34 American destroyers were based on Queenstown (now
Cobh) from which they joined in the anti-submarine operations in the Atlantic.
THE EASTERN FRONT
1916
In the hope of diverting German strength from the attack
at Verdun on the western front and under pressure from the Western Allies, the
Russians boldly but unwisely opened an offensive north and south of Lake Nar chest
at Vilna on March 18, 1916 and continued until March 27 winning some territory
at great cost and even then the gains were to be of a temporary nature.
The Russians then planned a major offensive for July. The
main blow was meant to be delivered by AE Evertad’s army corps assisted by an
internal movement of AN Kropotkin’s army in the southwestern front which was
ordered to feign a diversionary attack to cover the main attack. Interestingly,
Brusilow’s offensive turned out to be the main attack.
Urged on by the Italians to launch an offensive to
counter Austria’s Asiago offensive in May, the Russians once more launched a
major attack that turned out to be their last major offensive in the war.
The offensive
initially began well as Brusilow’s four armies were dispersed along a very wide
front reaching to Lutsk at the Northern end; Ternopol and Bichat in the central
sector and Czernowitz at the southern end. Having struck first in Ternopol and
Czernowitz sectors on June 4, Brusilov on June 5 took the Austrians wholly by
surprise when he launched AM Kaledins army towards Lutsk.
The defenses gave way and the attackers pushed in between
two Austrian armies. As this offensive gained momentum, the Russians penetrated
further in the Buchach sector and their advance into Bukovina resulted in the
capture of Czernowitz alongside 200,000 Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war.
The offensive was
however hampered by the refusal of Generals Evert and Kropotkin to coordinate
their strikes as agreed upon. An attempt by the Russian Chief of General Staff
MV Alekseev to transfer the reserve forces of these inept Generals came too
late to stop the Germans from reinforcing the Austrians and capitalize on the
late arrival of the reserves.
Brusilov’s advance however got to the Carpathian
Mountains but thereafter was checked by a German counter strike under General
Alexander von Vlissingen’s army in the Lutsk sector. Further efforts by the
Russians were launched in July but the opportunity to capitalize on the
advances was lost.
Brusilov’s advance had driven the Austrians from Bukovina
and much of Eastern Galicia and had inflicted huge losses of men and materials
on them but he had also cost Russia, casualties of over one million men.
Although Brusilov’s victory decimated the Austrians,
Russia seemed to lose more in terms of men and materials as the loss of over
one million men became too much for the country to bear, even though most were
deserters and prisoners.
Brusilov’s offensive also had an indirect result of great
consequence. First it had compelled the Germans to withdraw seven divisions
from the Western front, where they could ill afford to spare them from the
battles of Verdun and the Somme. Secondly it paved the way for Romania’s
unfortunate entry into the war.
Romania in utter disregard of her military weakness and
unpreparedness had yielded to the Allies’ entreaty to enter the war against the
Central Powers with offers of land and territorial gains and the belief that
the Central Powers would not have time to look her way. By so doing, she
launched an attack with 12 out of 23 divisions against the Austro-Hungarians
who could muster only five divisions.
The counter measures of the Central Powers proved to be
more devastating than the Romanian attack, as the Germans mustered five
divisions alongside two Austrian divisions under Malkensen’s at the orders of
Falkenhayn who though relieved of his overall command had this particular plan
of his approved.
Malkensen’s forces operating from Bulgaria stormed the
Turtucaia (Tutraken) bridge head on the Danube Southeast of Bucharest on the 5th
of September. His subsequent advance eastward caused the Romanians to abandon
their main advance in pursuit of the Bulgarian offensive.
Falkenhayn now a
direct field commander after his being relieved as the German Chief of staff
attacked the Romanians at the southern end of the 200 mile front where he threw
one of the Romanian columns back into the Roter Tuvin pass; by October 9 he had
defeated another Romanian army at Kroonstad.
For a month however the Romanians resisted the German
armies’ attempt to drive them out of the Vukan and Surduc passes into Walachia.
However just before winter snow could block their way; the Germans took the two
passes and advanced southward into Torgu jiu which they also held.
At this point Malkensen’s attacks converged with that of
Falkenhayn on the Bulgarian lines westward from Dobruja after crossing the
Danube near Bucharest. Bucharest fell on the 16th of December
together with the rest of the Romanian troops in it. The victory gave the
Central Powers control over Romanian’s wheat field and oil wells while
eventually giving the Russians 300 more miles to defend as a result of the
Bulgarian collapse.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC
CAMPAIGN 1916-JANUARY 1917
On the sea, controversy raged over the effectiveness of
Germany’s submarine warfare against the British trade lines. German Chief of
Naval Staff Admiral Scherer and General Falkenhayn seemed to both agree that
restricted submarine warfare in deference to America’s interests was preventing
the German Navy from gaining the upper hand on the High Seas.
While the civilian staff of the foreign office were
urging for restraint so as not to provoke the US into joining the Allies, the
military leaders were pushing for an unrestricted submarine warfare policy.
Between February 14 and May 1917, a policy of unrestricted warfare was
permitted but soon stopped again.