THE PARADOX OF UKRAINE: THE CHALLENGE
TO AMERICA’S GLOBAL HEGEMONY.
DATELINE: YALTA CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 1945.
The battle for global hegemony among
the Great Powers which is really the bone of contention in Ukraine has a
throwback to events that went as far back as to the Yalta conference in the
closing days of World War 2. At Yalta the shape and face of the post- 1945 world
was basically determined by the political and military horse-trading that
ensued between President Franklin Roosevelt of the US, Joseph Stalin of the
USSR, and Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain.
Although the Axis
partners in World War 2 did not expressly declare their war aims, it was pretty
obvious watching their political and military strategy that the destruction of
the pre- 1939 world order and the re-establishment of a new world order was
their primary war aim. The Axis powers Germany, Italy and Japan were obviously
determined to end the global primacy of Great Britain and France and re chart a
new world order.
Though the Axis partners emerged losers in the war, they
however succeeded in orchestrating events that led to the dethronement of Great
Britain and France from Global hegemony in 1945 and replacing them with the duo
of the United States and the USSR as the world’s two Super Powers that
dominated global politics for another half a century before the collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the Russian Federation as the
successor state to a USSR legacy that was measured more in terms of liabilities than assets, except of course for
the nuclear stockpile which was then the world’s largest.
Perhaps both President Bush and Clinton were disarmed by the
post cold war friendly posture and disposition of Russian Federation’s
President Boris Yeltsin who in any case in the political chaos and economic
collapse of the aftermath of the Soviet Union and the chaotic end of the
ill-fated Common wealth of Independent States had little choice but to embrace
whatever support the West had to offer.
The interesting development was that the United States
insisted that independent Ukraine surrender its nuclear stockpile inherited
from the erstwhile Soviet Union to Russia as a pre-condition for guaranteeing
Ukraine’s Independence and friendship. That was a grave mistake by American
policy makers who did not take time to reflect on the fact that the USSR’s
claim to Super Power status rested mainly on that arsenal.
Had the US offered its
friendship and strengthened Ukraine’s power as a nuclear but friendly power,
the present crises would not only have been prevented but the world would have
been racing to a global nuclear arms disarmament program by now.
Russia’s greatest incentive for nuclear disarmament would
have been a passionate desire not to share a common border with a nuclear armed
Ukraine. The West in 1992 did not see Ukraine then in that light. In an
agreement that smacked of Czechoslovakia in 1938, also known as the Munich agreement,
independent Ukraine was compelled by the Great Powers to unilaterally hand over
its only buffer against future Russian aggression to Russia under Boris
Yeltsin.
American policy makers
of the post World War 2 era and even till date unfortunately have a tradition
of making policies that are basically designed to satisfy short term rather
than long term interests and many times to satisfy a domestic political
audience without considering the long term implication.
I believe it all started in Yalta in February 1945 when
President Franklin Roosevelt anxious to get the European phase of the war over with and confront
Japan resolutely began an appeasement policy towards the USSR that succeeded in
handing over Eastern Europe over to the Russian leader over and above the
objection of Winston Churchill who could clearly see even then the future
negative consequences of Roosevelt’s appeasement policies towards Stalin.
Yalta and ultimately
Potsdam conference concessions by the West sold to the Russians the idea that
Eastern Europe was their preserved sphere of influence where the ideas of
democracy and human rights were solely in the preserve of the Russian state to
define as it saw pleasing to its leaders.
The Russians bought onto the idea that while Western Europe
was the preserve of the United States and Great Britain, Eastern Europe
particularly the nations Russian forces
had helped to liberate in WW2 were going to be theater of Russian politics and domination
until somebody could abolish that world order. The price that President
Roosevelt was willing to pay to Stalin to get Soviet support in the defeat of
Japan in 1945 is the main reason why Eastern Europe is still feeling insecure
till date and the Korean conflict continues to fester.
It was pretty obvious that the United States did not
anticipate nor prepare for global leadership in 1945. The Russians were
obviously better prepared to benefit from the spoils of war and the victory of
1945.Churchill a politically shrewd man who could read Stalin’s intentions
better was overruled many times by his stronger American partner whose devotion
to the ending of British imperial rule globally, clouded his judgement
regarding Churchill’s anxieties.
Sadly as the Yalta conference came to an end it was pretty
obvious that Roosevelt had come to trust Stalin and his submissions more than
that of Churchill. America’s experience as a former colony of Great Britain did
not help matters when it came to assessing Great Britain in matters of national
independence and nations rights to freedom and choice in 1945, particularly with
Great Britain’s brutal suppression of India’s independence aspirations in the
years leading to WW2.
The only person who came out of Yalta with a smug smile on
his face was Stalin. Harry S Truman feeling a need to defend the legacy of his
great predecessor and benefactor was quick to uphold all concessions the
visibly ill Roosevelt made at Yalta during the Potsdam conference, where he was
more concerned with the defeat of Japan than the fate of Eastern Europe and its
people.
Russia therefore came
out of World War 2 feeling that Eastern Europe is its allotted backyard where it holds
sway and dominates issues. After over half a century of playing that role
unchallenged by any power it is going to take time for the Russian people to
come to see things differently and that is what the West must come to understand.
No matter amount of sanctions will make Russia give up its
position overnight. It will take time, a lot of dialogue and peaceful posturing
by the West to get Russia to accept the concept of a sincerely independent
Ukraine. The concessions that created the perception were made by the Western
leaders of 1945 and after over a half century of enjoying that impunity it will
surely take time for Russia to peacefully let go of its past ‘conquests’.
Trying to fastrack the
process through a regime of sanctions will not change Russia’s position any
faster than the League of Nations sanctions on Japan in 1931. All the League
succeeded in doing then was to fastrack its own demise as NATO also seems to be doing now. It
took time to get to where we are and it will take time to get to where we ought
to be.
