THE US FIRST ARMY THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; THE FIRST ARMY’S DRIVE TO THE RHINE CHAPTER 10

THE FIRST ARMY’S DRIVE TO THE RHINE

With the battle of the Bulge practically over by the end of January 1945, General Eisenhower now concentrated on bringing his Five Armies to the Rhine on a broad front. Field Marshal Montgomery’s request for a northern route-led drive through Germany by the British 21^st Army Group was turned down effectively after the failure of Operation Market Garden to seize the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem; and with American troops out numbering the British 4 to 1, the next phase of the Allied campaign on the Western front was increasingly becoming an American affair.

The First Army now advanced to seize the Roer River Dams only to find out that the Germans had dynamited the dams leading to a deluge of water that flooded the entire plains, thereby hampering further advances in that sector. It took two full weeks for the flood to subside enough for the First and Ninth Armies to resume their advance.

 With the subsiding of the flood, First Army units commenced an advance towards the Rhine in the direction of Cologne. The momentum built up in the first week of March as the Allied Armies converged on the left bank of the Rhine preparatory to crossing the great River, the last natural barrier standing in the way of the Allies as they drove to Berlin

The First Army in the middle stood on the left bank of the River opposite the great city of Cologne. As the First Army pressed towards the edge of the River hoping to find a River crossing, the bridges went down. The German Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler had ordered the destruction of all bridges across the Rhine to deny the Allies any opportunity for a quick crossing of the River as the Rhine happened to be the last natural defensive barrier standing in the way of the Allies.

 The German Army in the West counted on the Rhine as their last hope in stemming the advance of the Allies and Field Marshal Walter Model commanding the Army Groups in the West sought to fortify the Western banks against any Allied attempts towards crossing the great River. Meanwhile the German Dictator, Adolf Hitler had ordered the destruction of all bridges across the Rhine as the Allied advance drew close to the Rhine River.

As elements of the retreating German forces streamed across the River many of the bridge crossings went down, even though some bridge crossings already mined preparatory to being blown up, were also deemed necessary for the fleeing German forces and vehicles to cross the River and strengthen the German defences on the east of the Ruhr. As such, at many points it became a game of chance to see how many Germans could be safely evacuated to the other side of the River before the bridges could be blown up in the face of the rapidly advancing Allies.

The American frontline officers in the First army knew that these opportunities existed and could be exploited even though their original orders stipulated that they should halt their advance on the west bank of the Rhine River and not attempt any crossing until directed from above. Major General William M. Hoges the commander of the 9^th Armored Division of the First Army’s III Corps in particular had been directed to turn south at Remagen and link up with elements of the Third Army advancing towards the Rhine.

However in apparent disregard of the directive and willing to take a chance during Operation Lumberjack, General Hoges ordered an Armored reconnaissance patrol of the Division to race to the River right through the line of the retreating German forces hoping to catch any of the two railroad bridges in that sector’s area intact. Intelligence had informed him that the Germans were holding onto the two bridges intact to enable as many elements as possible of the 15^th Army still trapped on the other side to escape capture from the rapidly advancing Americans fully motorIsed columns.

 The first was the Railroad Bridge at Remagen while the second bridge was at Wesel in today’s North Rhine-Westphalia. Near the town of Remagen, American forward observation units could see that the old railroad bridge across the Rhine was still standing, and they could see columns of German troops, remnants of the battered 15^th  Army retreating across the River with trains packed full of wounded soldiers and equipment still crossing.

By early 1945, American industrial production was at its peak and all elements of its Army in Europe whether armored or infantry units were fully motorIsed, ensuring that breakthroughs were exploited at break neck speeds which often bypassed the largely foot - mobile and horse carriage driven German infantry formations. This cost the Germans dearly in the retreat towards the Rhine as large bodies of walking infantry units were simply by passed and abandoned on the west bank of the Rhine by the mechanized and motorIsed Allied columns.

 German Dictator Adolf Hitler, not unmindful of the speed of the Allied advance had ordered all the Rhine River crossings blown up in the face of the inexorable Allied advance even when thousands of his men were still floundering on the other side of the River in late February. Some daring German officers who saw no reason in leaving men trapped behind Allied lines, who were desperately needed in the defense of the Fatherland, decided to take a chance in holding off the demolitions for as long as possible especially when the 15^th Army alone had over 90,000 men still trapped on the other side of the Rhine when the Bridges demolition order arrived.

 On receiving the report about the still-functional bridge at Remagen the 9^th Armored Division’s commander General Hoges ordered a full reconnaissance patrol to race towards the bridge as well as ordering the tanks of the 9^th Armored Division to speed ahead to give fire support to the reconnaissance patrol in the eventuality of a fire fight at the approach of the bridge. On seeing American motorIsed units approaching the bridge, the German defenders set off an explosive charge that detonated, lifting the bridge up in the air but failed to destroy it, as its superstructure settled back in place.

 Thereafter three US combat engineers namely Lieutenant Hugh Mott, Staff Sergeant John Reynolds and Sergeant Eugene Dorland  of the 2^nd platoon ‘B’ company of the 9^th armored engineer battalion rushed onto the bridge in company of other supporting infantry men and hastily set about dismantling the demolition charges and fuses in place, while at the same time, a combat reconnaissance company led by Sergeant Alexander A Drabik and Lieutenant Karl H. Timmerman of Combat Command B of the 9^th Armored Division became the first NCO and officer respectively to race across the bridge and cross the Rhine River on the 7^th of March 1945 in the face of determined but sporadic German resistance.

Following the crossing, the bridge was secured and hasty repairs were effected, enabling the first Sherman tanks to cross the Rhine. When Lieutenant General Omar N Bradley cautiously informed General Eisenhower of the capture of the bridge, knowing he had no orders to cross the Rhine, Ike reportedly excited and dumbfounded by the news, inquired from Bradley about how many soldiers he had within the vicinity and how many he could ‘throw’ across the River.

 Within twenty four hours over 8,000 soldiers, tanks and vehicles had been moved across the bridge and a bridge head was built up to protect the bridge from  subsequent and prolonged German counter attacks in the days and weeks following and artillery salvoes from long-range guns including a railway gun  that were aimed at destroying the bridge.

The furious German High Command even sent a sortie of their latest Arado Ar 234 Jets to bomb the bridge which also proved unsuccessful. V-2 rocket attacks were also launched at the bridge as well as attacks by frogmen and floating mines which all failed. An attempt to aim long range artillery from a rail way gun at the bridge also missed.

 However on the 17^th of March 1945, after ten days of continually absorbing attacks and crossings by three US Divisions, the 9^th Infantry, 78^th Infantry and the 99^th Infantry Division of the US First Army, the bridge suddenly collapsed while combat engineers were laboring strenuously to weld and strengthen the super structure. 28 Engineers plunged to their deaths and 93 others were injured.

The capture of the bridge however proved to be both a tactical and strategic success enabling the first penetration of Germany beyond the Rhine, even as the eventual collapse of the bridge was overcome as several pontoon bridges were already in place and the bridge head had been expanded deep enough for the First Army to carry its assault into Germany proper.

Following the capture of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, the First Army was directed to widen and consolidate its bridgehead while awaiting the crossing of the Rhine by the other Allied Armies as General Eisenhower had directed that the Allied Armies advance abreast of each other on a wide front. Field Marshal Montgomery’s bid and push for an advance on a narrow front by the British led 21st Army group had by now being rejected in favor of a wide front advance into Germany simultaneously by all the Three Allied Army Groups operational as of March 1945.

On the night of 22/23^rd March 1945, the Third Army crossed the Rhine at Oppenheim and Nierstein, while the British 21^st Army Group began its well rehearsed crossings on the 23^rd of March 1945, well supported by an intense preparation involving heavy air attacks, artillery barrage and the landing of two airborne divisions, the 6^th British and 17^th US airborne divisions directly on the enemy positions on the east bank of the Rhine.  

Following the break out from the Rhine, the First Army now operating once more as part of the US 12^th Army group under Lt General Omar N Bradley was ordered to resume its offensive in the direction of Giessen and the Lahn River, 65 miles east of Remagen on the morning of the 25^th of March. Bradley’s command of the First Army had been restored at the end of the battle of the Bulge. The First Army now outflanked the defenses the Germans erected on the east-west Sieg River south of Cologne where the Germans expected the First Army to attack northwards. In course of the drive, the three Corps of the First Army then turned northwards towards Paderborn before linking up with advancing units of the US Ninth Army under Lt General William H Simpson.

 All three Corps of the First Army participated in the break out, which on the first day involved five infantry and two Armored Divisions. The US VII Corps faced the stiffest resistance as it had to fully engage its armored forces to force a gain of 12 miles or 19 kilometers beyond its line of departure, while the III Corps without committing its armor made a gain of 4 miles or 6 kilometers. The V Corps on the other hand made a gain of 5-8 miles on the right meeting minimal resistance.

By the next day being the 26^th of March, all three Corps, while advancing shattered the enemy opposition they came across as they fully deployed their armored strength advancing over fifty miles beyond their take off point and moving at will in many instances into enemy rear areas. Organized German resistance had diminished considerably after the Allies crossed the Rhine. In many instances, the resistance was nothing more than a hastily mounted road block which the motorIsed columns easily brushed aside or outflanked as they deemed necessary.

It had become obvious to the Allied commanders that the Wermacht had dissipated its last remaining strength in the Battle of the Bulge. By the end of the 28^th of March, Courtney Hodges force had advanced beyond the Lahn River, meeting little opposition as the enemy offered only sporadic resistance. Soon thereafter, elements of the First Army had captured Paderborn, 80 miles north of Giessen and had made contact with elements of the Third Army that were covering their right flank and were driving down from their beachhead while headed northwest towards Kassel.

On March 29, a column of the VII Corp’s 3^rd Armored Division equipped with the latest Pershing M26 heavy tanks led the advance to Paderborn with an attached Infantry Regiment of the 104^th Division on its flank while the rest of the 104^th Infantry followed closely, enabling the task force to hold any grounds gained. By so doing the task force advanced over 45 miles or 72 kilometers without meeting any serious opposition.

 They spent the night at a point about 24 kilometers to Paderborn and the following day resumed the advance, only to immediately run into stiff opposition from elements of a German training school cadets of an SS Panzer replacement Depot equipped with over sixty tanks who held up the advance of the task force all day. On being informed about the problem, Major General J Lawton Collins commander of the VII Corps requested that General Simpson’s Ninth Army provide some help.

 General Simpson now requested a Combat Command of the 2^nd Armored Division which had just advanced to Beckum to make a 15 mile (24kilometers) advance south eastward to Lippstadt midway between Beckum and the spearhead of the 3^rd Armored held up by the resisting German forces. By so doing the advance spearheads of the First and Ninth Armies met up, sealing the Ruhr industrial Region, encircling Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group B within the American lines of advance.

 Although encircled, Army Group B made desperate efforts to break through to the east but these moves were easily repulsed by the vastly superior American forces. With First Army holding up about two thirds of the pocket while the Ninth Army held on to the other one third, the pocket was consistently squeezed through concentric attacks by both Armies so that by the 13^th of April the pocket had been split in two between the First and the Ninth Armies.

 The First Army’s attack northward was led by the First Army’s III Corp on the 5^th of April supplemented on 6^th of April by attacks of the XVIII Corp of the American Airborne Army that had been reassigned to General Courtney Hodges after the conclusion of Operation Varsity; the British 21^st Army Group’s crossing of the Rhine River. The IV and V Corp of the First Army pressed the attack east ward.

 The Ninth Army cleared the northern end of the pocket while the attacks of the 8^th Infantry Division’s XVIII Corp of the First Army further split the southern section into two by reaching the southern bank of the Ruhr River. By April 16^th - 18^th, German opposition had collapsed and the rest of the German units fell in as prisoners and the fighting ceased.

 The resulting encirclement led to the destruction of Army Group B the last major German force holding up the Allies in the West. When the final prisoner count of over 325,000 men was completed, the largest on the Western Front, Field Marshal Model was unaccounted for, presumably a suicide case. With the reduction of the Ruhr pocket and the destruction of Army Group B, the advance in the West predictably turned to a pursuit as the German forces still in the field were increasingly unable to halt the Allied advances all across the west.  

THE US FIRST ARMY FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; Malmedy Massacre CHAPTER 8

Malmedy Massacre

To the north, units of the 6^th SS Panzer Army Kampfgruppe Peiper made up of 4,800 men and 600 vehicles under the command of Waffen SS Colonel Joshen Peiper had advanced west into Belgium and at 0700 hours in December 17 had captured a US fuel dump at Bullingen. Further south, Hasso Von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army crossed the Our River and attacked the key centers of St Vith and Bastogne. German tanks seized the surrounding villages. Advancing west ward, at 1230 hours near the village of Baugnez half way between Malmedy and Ligneuville, they encountered a unit of the American 285^th Field artillery observation battalion, who were seized after a brief exchange of gunfire. The prisoners together with some others captured earlier numbered about 150.  Meanwhile the advancing Panzer Grenadiers had handed over the American prisoners, who were sent to stand in a field on a cross road to be handed over to a group of rear guard SS detachment.

 Here while standing in the field, they were herded round and machine gunned by the SS detachment meant to oversee them in a callous act that came to be known as the Malmedy massacre. Some of the survivors were able to escape into the neighboring forest. In all over 84 men were killed.

 The escaping prisoners took the news to the Allied lines where the news of the shooting spread like wildfire, caused consternation and ultimately stiffened resistance to the advance. The news that the Germans were not taking prisoners alive, though ultimately not true; as this incident and one other massacre seemed to suggest, nevertheless had a dramatic effect on the retreating and demoralized American forces. The battle as a result now took on the ferocity of the fight to the deaths which American forces were more familiar with in the Pacific theater.

The Americans subsequently took revenge in shooting scores of German prisoners particularly the SS fallschirmjagen (paratroopers). The news of the prisoners- killing subsequently stiffened the fighting spirit of the American soldiers who now believed that surrendering was no longer a viable option. No SS soldier was guaranteed his safety any more in American captivity and few Americans thereafter were willing to be taken prisoner, to the ultimate detriment of the German advance in the Battle of the Bulge.

The subsequent advance of the Sixth SS Panzer Army encountered much stiffer resistance as the Germans approached positions of the US 99^th Infantry Division who put up a stiff fight in spite of the fact that the men were green. The prisoner shooting incident stiffened the fighting spirit of the soldiers and the German advance began to encounter stiff bottlenecks as the Americans denied them gains at every road block, villages, hamlets, destroying bridges, fuel dumps and anything that could aid the German advance.

When the German advance reached Stavelot, they were far behind schedule as they took thirty six hours to accomplish in 1944 what took them only nine hours to accomplish in the same advance in 1940. Eleven black soldiers were also shot by the 1^st SS Division under Kampfgruppe Hungen but due to paucity of evidence, this massacre went largely unpublicized and unavenged.

Before the battle of the Bulge, colored soldiers in the US army were not assigned to combat duties but served only as stevedores, truck drivers and in logistics support. The paucity of fighting men at the height of this battle and the desperate need for re-enforcements at the front coupled with the inability of the training schools back in the US to meet the increasing need of trained replacements for combat duties finally persuaded General Eisenhower to issue orders authorizing willing colored units to participate in combat duties.

 In many instances cooks, medics, drivers and other non-combatants were drafted into the fight to stem the German advance as the need arose particularly in the early days of the attack when the Allied lines were dangerously stretched to a breaking point. The performance of the colored soldiers was not perceived as any much different from that of the regular G.I’s.

If anything they were overly enthusiastic about the opportunity given to them to engage in regular combat and correct the negative stereo types concerning colored troops generally. Colored units thereafter were generally albeit grudgingly allowed to fight in the frontlines in WW2 in the European theater of Operation even though the units remained strictly segregated along racial lines.

However colored troops taken as prisoners stood the greater risk of being shot by the racially murderous SS units and it is believed that the fate that befell the eleven black soldiers taken prisoners and shot was racially inspired.

Sixth Panzer Army’s assault on Stavelot on December 18^th  encountered bitter resistance from the American defenders who were ready to fight to the death, the Malmedy Massacre being at the back of every soldiers involved in the battle. Peiper unable to breach the American defenses in spite of his heavily armored columns left a small support force at the front and detoured to the bridge at Trois – Parte, where the retreating American Engineers had already destroyed the bridge. He subsequently went off to the village of La Gleize and from there to Stormount where the bridge was blown up in his face by the American defenders.

With his troops trapped behind the American lines as the Americans recaptured Stavelot on December 19, the Sixth Panzer Army decided to pull back to La Gleize to await a German relief force which never materialized. With no relief force able to penetrate the strongly held American lines, the Germans on December 23^rd were forced to escape on foot through the Allied lines back to Germany thereby abandoning all their vehicles and heavy equipments.

In St Vith, elements of the US First Army’s 7^th Armored Division, including one regiment of the US 106^th Infantry Division as well as elements of the US 9^th Armored Division and the US 28^th Infantry Division all under the command of General Bruce C Clarke set up a road block that successfully resisted the attacks of Manteuffel’s 5^th Panzer Army and Sepp Dietrich’s Sixth Panzer Army; thereby slowing the German advance at critical points.

Under heavy pressure, the US forces defending St Vith were ordered to give up and withdraw to prepared defensive positions nearby where they were entrenched in a dogged defense. By December 23^rd, with their flanks shattered by the German armored assaults, the defenders were withdrawn to a point west of the Salk River. Meanwhile the German attack had fallen behind schedule and was daily losing the momentum as the American defenses stiffened.

Lt General George S Patton, meanwhile ordered to reinforce the defenses of the First Army and relieve Bastogne by Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D Eisenhower had committed Three Corps of his Third Army to the operation with the 4^th Armored Division under direct orders to relieve the 101^st Airborne Division encircled in Bastogne by the German Army.

On December 20^th General Eisenhower detached the US First and Ninth Armies from Lt General Omar N Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group and placed them under the command of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s British 21^st Army Group. It was a decision that left Bradley bitter and resentful over the depletion of his command even though it was obvious that he had been struggling to direct his splintered armies from across the northern end of the Bulge.

By December 21^st, German forces had Bastogne surrounded on all sides and in spite of repeated attacks could not take the town. With the Americans low on ammunition and medical supplies, their position was dire. The German commander now sent an emissary to induce the acting commander of the 101^st Airborne Division Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe to surrender.

 In a moment of irritation and annoyance he uttered ‘nuts’ which was dutifully transcribed and sent to the German commander as the reply by his bewildered staff officers. The commander of the 101^st Airborne Division, Major General Maxwell Taylor was meanwhile on an official engagement in Washington when his Division was called to action in Bastogne.

The American officers meanwhile had to explain the meaning of ‘nuts’ to the German representative as meaning a categorical no to the German surrender request. The subsequent German artillery barrage, though heavy and sustained and for many American soldiers, the heaviest and most sustained they had ever been through, still failed to induce surrender. The subsequent German attacks, ferocious though they were, were unable to breach the Bastogne perimeter in spite of the fact that McAuliffe’s command post was almost overrun at a time.

Meanwhile by the 23^rd of December the clouds had begun to break, enabling the Allied Air Force to take to the skies the next day. Thereafter rocket-firing American P-47 Republic fighters as well as Mustang P-51 fighters began to hit the German armored and motorized columns forcing the Germans to seek the protection of secondary roads as relief from the air attacks as well as to out flank the American road blocks.

 These all helped to slowdown and eventually bog down the German advance which was also increasingly being slowed by fuel shortages as there were fewer and fewer available fuel dumps as the Allies either relocated or destroyed the existing fuel dumps as they retreated.

Meanwhile Field Marshal Montgomery ordered all available British units within the vicinity of the Meuse River Crossings, whether combat or non-combat units to head to the Meuse bridge crossings and secure them from the impending German advance and efforts at crossing the River. Even the British 29^th armored Brigade which had just turned in its tanks for refitting was ordered to take back the tanks and head to the River crossings alongside XXX corps.

By December 24^th Allied Air power began to take its toll on the German columns while Bastogne was resupplied with food, medicine and ammunition from the air. The Allied fighter bombers also began to hit the German supply trucks with devastating effect.  The combined effect of all these was that the spearhead of the German advance practically ground to a halt a few miles short of the Meuse River at the best instance.

 With the German supply lines stretched to a breaking point, Allied fighter bombers harassing the supply trucks, and tanks beginning to run out of fuel, and the Meuse River crossings effectively held by Allied troops, the German attack ran out of steam, and the momentum began to shift in the Allies’ favor.

On December 24^th Hasso Von Manteuffel viewing the dire strategic situation, sent a message to Hitler through his military adjutant advising that all offensive operations be suspended along with a withdrawal back to the West Wall. Hitler rejected the advice. Meanwhile elements of Patton’s Third Army namely the hard fighting 37^th tank battalion of the 4^th Armored Division had broken through the German lines and made contact with American troops in Bastogne at 1650 hours on 26^th of December ending the siege of Bastogne.

 By January 1 in a bid to kick start the offensive that had ground to a halt, the German Luftwaffe sent in hundreds of planes in a last ditch effort to destroy Allied Air power, attacking and destroying  on the ground hundreds of Allied war planes, over 465 aircraft in total. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe sustained over 275 irreplaceable losses some to Allied fighters, but mostly to Allied anti- air craft guns set up to track and destroy the V – I flying bombs.

On the same day Army Group G launched an operation against the lines of the US Seventh Army in the south code-named Operation Nordwind which seriously hurt the men and forces of the Franco-American 7^th Seventh Army and forced them to retreat to defensive positions on the south bank of the Mode River on January 21.

 At a time Strasbourg seemed to be in danger of falling once more to the Germans to the great alarm of the French government as General Eisenhower briefly considered abandoning the city in the face of the unrelenting German attacks. It took the heroic defense efforts of the French units of the 7^th Army to save the city.

The German attack finally petered out by January 15^th but with a bulge extending dangerously into the Allied center. The Allies decided to counterattack to reduce and if possible cut off the Germans caught in the bulge. For this reason on January 1, Patton’s Third Army was ordered to attack the salient from the south while Montgomery was ordered to cut off the bulge from the north in a pincer movement designed to entrap and capture the German forces in the bulge.

While Patton promptly initiated his attack on the 1^st of January, Montgomery held off his attacks until January 3 in order to complete his preparations by which time the German forces sensing the danger began desperately to retreat to escape the entrapment even without most of their vehicles and heavy equipment. By January 7^th, Adolf Hitler finally decided to call off the offensive and withdraw his force back to their start line. The two tips of the Allied pincer movements finally closed on January 15^th and the battle of the Bulge was officially over.

Official German losses including dead, wounded and prisoners of war were over 100,000 while The Americans sustained over 89,000 casualties including 19,000 confirmed dead with over 48,000 listed as wounded or missing. The Allies lost over 730 tanks while The Germans lost over 600 tanks. The fact was that while the Allies could replace their losses, the Germans could not replace theirs including the 30 reserve divisions that had been held back in Germany to contain the impending Soviet winter offensive.

 When the Soviet armies launched their offensive on January 12, there were practically no German reserves to stop the Soviet drive that carried 300 kilometers all the way from the Vistula River in Poland to the Elbe River in East Prussia, 60 kilometers or one hour drive away from Berlin in early February 1945.  Hitler’s gamble had failed, opening the road to Berlin to the Allies and the US First Army characteristically led the way.

THE US FIRST ARMY THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; Malmedy Massacre 2 CHAPTER 9

To the north, units of the 6^th SS Panzer army Kampfgruppe peiper made up of 4,800 and 600 vehicles under the command of Waffen SS Colonel Joshen Peiper had advanced west into Belgium and at 0700 hours in December 17 had captured a U.S fuel dump at Bullingen where they paused to refuel before continuing their were sent to stand in a field on a cross road.

 Here while standing, they were machine gunned.  Some of the survivors were able to escape into the neighboring forest. In all over 84 men were killed. The escaping prisoners took the news to the Allied lines where the news of the shooting spread like wildfire, caused consternation and stiffened resistance to the advance.

The Americans subsequently took revenge in shooting scores of German prisoners particularly the SS fallschirmjagen (paratroopers) subsequently. The news of the prisoners killing subsequently stiffened the fighting spirit of the American Soldiers who now realised that surrendering was no longer a viable option.

The subsequent advance of sixth Panzer SS army encountered much stiffer resistance as the Germans approached positions of the US 99^th Infantry division who put up a stiff fight in spite of the fact that the men were green. The prisoner shooting incident stiffened the fighting spirit of the soldiers and the German advance began to encounter stiff bottlenecks as the Americans denied them gains at every road block, villages, hamlets, destroying bridges, fuel dumps and anything that could aid the German advance.

When the German advance reached Stavelot, they were far behind schedule as they took 36 hours to accomplish in 1944 what took them only 9 hours to accomplish in the same advance in 1940. Eleven black soldiers were also shot by the 1^st SS Division under Kampfgruppe Hungen but due to paucity of evidence, this massacre went largely unavenged and unpublicized.

Before the battle of the bulge, black soldiers in the U.S army were not assigned to combat duties but served only as stevedores, truck drivers and in logistics support. The paucity of fighting men at the height of the battle persuaded Eisenhower to release the blacks to combat duties and blacks thereafter could fight in frontline but at the greater risk of being shot when taken as prisoners by the racially murderous SS units and it is believed that was the fate that befell the eleven black soldiers taken prisoners and shot was racially inspired.

THE US FIRST ARMY THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE CHAPTER 7

THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

Just as soon as the Hurtgen forest fell to the US first army on the 15^th   of December, the following day being the 16^th of December 1944, saw the launch of Germany’s last major offensive on the Western front which came to be known as the battle of the Bulge because of the bulge created in Allied lines as shown in the battle maps on American newspapers.

That the Germans could mount such a major offensive, taking the Allies completely by surprise along 80 kilometers of the front line defended by First army units stretched between the Ardennes forests in Belgium all the way down south to Luxembourg was completely unexpected.

The German assault fell primarily on the First army which had been heavily engaged in the battle of the Hurtgen forest, and was determined to drive to the Rhine along the lines of the Roer River through the Cologne plains while capturing the Roer River dams.

While units of the First army were busy down south locked in a bitter fight with the German army in the Hurtgen area, the army had sent the experienced but tired 28^th Infantry division from the Hurtgen battle zone to the Ardennes forested area between Belgium and Luxembourg for rest and refit. It had deemed the Ardennes front a quiet area where tired divisions could be rested and green troops or newly arriving divisions could be billeted and refitted pending engagements.

THE US FIRST ARMY THE FORGOTTEN HEROES OF WW2; THE BREAK OUT INTO BRITTANY CHAPTER 6

The following day being the 1^st of August the 3^rd Army was activated under Lieutenant General George S Patton and the American forces swept into Brittany while Patton’s forces turned east to clear the Cotentin Peninsular, the First Army turned west to link up with the advancing elements of the British 21^st battle group with a view to trapping the German 7^th and 5^th armies in a huge pincer movement around the town of Falaise and destroy the German armies in the field.

The Third Army subsequently advanced westward to capture Man, the erstwhile headquarters of the German Seventh Army and also cut off the retreat of the German forces trapped in the Cotentin Peninsular. German Dictator Adolf Hitler, in a foolhardy move ordered Field Marshal Von Kluge to launch a counter offensive against the advancing Allied Armies with a view to splitting the British and American armies between Mortain and Avranches and throw them back into the sea if possible.

 Against his own better judgment Von Kluge committed the remainder of his seven armored divisions in a counter attack codenamed operation Luttich. Von Kluge’s intentions were intercepted by the Ultra intelligence operation and the Allied commanders duly informed, waited for him.

 On August 7^th the attack was launched by the panzer divisions that could muster only 75 Panzer IV and 70 Panther tanks and 32 self propelled guns. Hopelessly outnumbered, the offensive was over in 24 hours with the German forces completely routed and desperately seeking to avoid the encirclement that was closing in on them around Falaise.

The depleted German armored divisions were almost completely annihilated by the combined power of four Allied armies that had them completely surrounded and pulverized with air and artillery strikes, which completely decimated them, and left the dazed survivors fleeing on foot in the direction of the Seine River in the bid to escape the noose of the Allied encirclement. Two complete German armies the 7^TH and the 5^th were caught in the jaws of the Allied pincers.

A failure of proper co-ordination between the 90^TH division of the First army and the inexperienced Polish 1^st armored division of the Canadian 4^TH Army, particularly in the sector closed by the Polish Corp left a fifteen mile gap through which many German soldiers managed to escape on foot out of the pocket, leaving behind 50,000 prisoners and most of their vehicles and equipments.

 Some historians blame General Bradley who had now been lifted to the command of the two American armies the 12^th army group for stopping Patton’s forces just short of the point of sealing the pocket for fear of the advancing British and American units converging on the pocket clashing accidentally. 

 Altogether over 150,000 Germans managed to escape from the pocket, crossed the Seine River and regrouped on the other side. Over 100,000 German soldiers were killed or wounded in the operation. This defeat gave the Allied armies the opportunity to advance towards the Seine over undefended territory as all the Allied armies advanced in pursuit of the fleeing enemy.

The fleeing Germans crossed the Seine River and hastily built a new defensive line on the left side of the River. With the collapse of the German positions in Normandy, the advancing British and American armies began a race for the French capital to forestall a regrouping of the German forces.

 As they approached Paris the Allies decided to bypass the city and instead pursue the fleeing Germans to give them no respite. General Courtney Hicks Hodges had assumed the command of the First Army upon the elevation of Lieutenant General Omar N Bradley to the command of the newly formed 12^th Army group consisting of the US First Army and General George S Patton’s Third Army.

 Lieutenant General Hodges now ordered his Army to cross the Seine River across bridge heads established between Mantes – Grassi courts and Mellon to the east, beginning an equally spectacular advance with three Corps towards Namur, Liege and the German frontier.

Moving on the right flank, VII Corps crossed the Aisne River on August 29, while Soissons was overrun by elements of the 3^rd armored division which also seized Laon the next day after overcoming heavy enemy resistance. The advance of the 3^rd armored division proceeded swiftly and on the 1^st of September 1944 advanced to a point 30 miles north east of Laon

The next two days saw the columns advancing over 40 miles, crossing the Belgian border in the Hirson area and reaching Charleroi and Mons. Moving on the left flank a rapidly advancing column of XIX Corps moving from the Mantes bridge head led by the 2^nd armored division advanced over 13miles on 30^th August and another 20 miles of break taking advance brought it close to Montdidier in Belgium.

By September 2, XIX Corps had reached the Belgian border south of Tournai, an incredible advance of 60 miles in 2 days. The consequence of this swift advance was that the armored division completely outflanked and by passed large pockets of German soldiers as they outpaced and outran the retreating German army. The Germans trapped in the pocket extending from Mons area to Compiegne – St Quentin reaching a line east of Cambrai eventually capitulated and over 25,000 of them were taken prisoner over a period of three days.

On the 4^th of September, the First army turned at a right angle to the east, with the V Corps moving on the right flank crossing the Meuse River north of Sedan on the 5^th- 6^th September 1944. Sedan eventually fell to the 5^th armored division on the 6^th of September opening up a front that led to a rapid advance across Belgium and Luxembourg on a 65 mile front.

The 5^th armored division eventually liberated the city of Luxembourg on the 10^th of September, and by the 11^th, V Corps had reached the German frontier, confronting the Siegfried line and its defenses. Up north, units of the VII Corps captured the Belgian town of Namur and the River Meuse crossings near Dinant and continued to advance down along both banks of the River towards Liege’.

German resistance was heavy but by September 8^th, the Americans broke through and Liege fell, but the relentless advance of VII Corps brought its leading elements into Luxembourg which was located 13 miles southwest of Aachen. The First Army was now deep within the defensive depth of the West wall also known as the Siegfried line.

The German crisscross of defenses, mine fields, road blocks, artillery emplacements and pill boxes slowed down but did not completely stop the First Army which pressed on with determination to breach the defenses of the Siegfried line and gain a foothold on German soil.

That notwithstanding the American advance still made some territorial gains on the 10^th of September 1944 that brought the big guns of VII Corps into range of German territory for the first time. Further north in Belgium, VII Corps had pushed its way forward alongside XIX Corps and had captured both Eupen and Malmedy while XIX Corps was at the outskirts of Maastricht and further south had crossed the Meuse River.

In a spectacular advance, the First Army had swept down from the Seine River across France, Belgium and Luxembourg and was now at the front door of Germany in the autumn of 1944. First Army was now poised to take the first major German city seized by the Allies in World War 2, that is Aachen and there after invest the German positions across the Roer River in a bid to breach the Siegfried line and make a dash for the Rhine, the last natural barrier preventing the Allies from striking at the heart of Germany and the Ruhr industrial region.

At this point German resistance stiffened considerably as the war entered into Germany proper. The autumn rains, mud and onset of winter along with swollen Rivers combined to place natural obstacles on the path of the advance of First Army as they prepared to breach the extensive defenses of the Siegfried line.

 The expectation that the war would be over by Christmas was to prove to be a hoax and a futile dream to the average American as the network of pill boxes, Dragon’s teeth, forts and concrete tunnels extending hundreds of miles across the frontlines made them realize that defeating Germany was not going to be a walk over as they had been led to believe.

The First Army thus had the tough privilege of taking the first major German city in battle. The initial plan had centered on by passing the city and allowing it to fall on its own terms but as the Allies advanced, it became increasingly clear that the Germans were preparing an all out defense, and that it would be dangerous to leave such a well fortified position in the rear of the Allied lines. General Courtney Hodges therefore ordered the units of the VII Corps to invest the city beginning in the first week of September.

Because Aachen sat right in the middle of the Siegfried line it was completely fortified with an extensive network of tunnels, pill boxes, barbed wire entanglements and concrete obstacles known as Dragon’s teeth. Because of its historical importance and strategic location it had become imperative to seize it in the drive to Germany proper.

 Even though the German garrison commander General Gerhard Von Schwerin commanding the 116^th Panzer division had intended to surrender the city to the Allies in order to spare the civilian population the ravages of war and also save the old imperial city from destruction, Adolf Hitler’s directive for him to launch an attack on the Allied lines frustrated his plans, which in any case was soon divulged to Hitler when his surrender letter was intercepted and delivered to Hitler.

He was promptly arrested and replaced by General Gerhard Wilck, who set about defending the city with the corresponding heavy loss of lives and destruction of property. By the 16 ^TH of September, Aachen had been surrounded on three sides by the First Army’s 1^st infantry division but the dearth of supplies and the diversion of logistics support to assist Field Marshall Montgomery’s Operation Market Garden in the Netherlands prevented the First Army from immediately taking the city.

The fighting eventually carried on through late October and involved bitter battles on the part of the 30^th and 1^st infantry divisions which bore the brunt of the fighting and the casualties. Aachen being on the hinge of the Siegfried line saw the beginning of a stiffening of German defenses and a willingness to fight on the part of the Germans that had not been obvious in France particularly after the battles of the hedgerows and the break out from Brittany.

In Aachen, which represented the first calculated effort by the Allies to denigrate and ultimately breach the Siegfried line, the American fighting spirit in the face of a tenacious all- out defense began to emerge. For once both parties shared parity in terms of determination to hold pre-determined objectives, which for the Americans rested on a determination to destroy the German army once and for all, regardless of the cost.

 Aachen and ultimately the battle of the Hurtgen forest showed the beginning of a willingness by the American military authorities to pay the price for victory in blood and material losses in a way that stunned the German High Command and began to shape their beliefs in the fact that unless the Americans in particular could be stopped, the war was lost as far as the western front was concerned. A lot of steely resolve was demonstrated by both parties as the hard slog unfolded.

In Aachen the First Army fought a sustained battle of attrition for over six weeks from the first week of September to the third week of October. In the words of General Eisenhower it was the beginning of the hard slog campaign against the German enemy in the face of the clear defeat the Allies faced in Operation Market Garden which was thought up by Field Marshal Montgomery as a plan to force a way into Germany through the northern route and thereby outflank the Siegfried line.

It had become pretty clear after the failed operation that there was just no way to outflank the Siegfried line and the dreary prospect of the positional and entrenched warfare of 1914-1918 loomed as an unavoidable prospect for the Allies as the First Army bore down on Aachen.